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 This study examines asymmetric information content of REIT IPOs as compared 
to that of industrial IPOs matched by similar asset size, underwriter reputation ranking, 
and partial adjustment of the offer-price from the midpoint of the original file range. The 
asymmetric information level is proxied by the relative bid-ask spread (RELSPREAD), 
adverse selection component of Glosten and Harris (GH, 1988), and the adverse selection 
component of Lin, Sanger, and Booth (LSB, 1995). All three measures are estimated over 
45- and 60-day windows. 
 Using a sample of 78 equity REIT IPOs and 123 Industrial IPOs for the period of 
January 1, 1993 to December 31, 2007, the results indicate that REIT IPOs have less 
asymmetric information content as compared to mature industrial firms. All results 
control for leverage, beginning assets size, issue proceeds, underpricing, partial 
adjustment, number of IPOs within the same year, venture capital backing, underwriter 
reputation, average daily volume, average daily price, specialist’s inventory risk, and the 
turnover ratio. The results also control for the Nasdaq and NYSE rule change of 
minimum tick increments from 1/8th to 1/16th on June 2, 1997, and June 24, 1997, 
respectively. The findings provide strong support for the hypothesis that REIT IPOs have 
less asymmetric information content than non-REIT IPOs. 
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Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT) initial public offerings (IPOs) have provided 
a fertile area for research because of their trust structure, regulatory restrictions, 
homogeneous asset structure, tax status, and significant dividend payout ratios. In 
addition, REITs have grown in popularity from approximately $42 million in equity 
market capitalization at the end of 1962 to over $192 billion in equity market 
capitalization in 2008 (Chan, Erickson, and Wang, 2003; and NAREIT, 2009). For these 
reasons REITs beg to be studied, not only from the perspective of investors, managers, 
and public officials who have a financial interest in them, but also from an academic 
perspective since these unique attributes provide a rich environment in which to test 
finance theories. Within the analysis of REIT IPOs, one of the many issues open for 
debate is the difficulty of REIT IPO valuation due to informational opaqueness.  
This study seeks to fill this gap by assessing the level of equity REIT IPO 
informational transparency using (1) the relative bid-ask spread, (2) the adverse selection 
cost as a proportion of the quoted bid-ask spread using the Glosten and Harris (GH, 1988) 
model, and (3) the adverse selection cost as a proportion of the effective bid-ask spread 
using the Lin, Sanger, and Booth (LSB, 1995) model. All three measures are estimated 
over the first 45 and 60 days of the IPO and compared to that of three different matched 
samples of industrial IPOs. The goal is to determine whether equity REIT IPOs contain 
2 
more or less asymmetric information than industrial firm IPOs. In addition, this study 
analyzes the determinants of REIT asset transparency.  
REITs and asymmetric information are not foreign to each other, at least when 
considered within the context of Leland and Pyle (1977) who show that intermediaries 
owe their very existence to the presence of asymmetric information. REITs are clearly 
intermediaries because of their ability to provide asset divisibility within the context of 
Klein (1973) and reduced transaction costs within the context of Bentson and Smith 
(1976). While it is logical that intermediation reduces information asymmetry, the 




1.1. Arguments for REIT IPO Asset Opacity 
The REIT IPO literature is divided and inconclusive as to the opacity of REIT 
assets. Consider first the literature that argues that REIT IPOs are more opaque than other 
common stocks. Wang, Chan, and Gau (1992) contend that REIT founders often fail to 
specify either partially or fully the properties to be acquired at the IPO stage, and this 
creates greater uncertainty for investors regarding the firm’s value as compared to that of 
an industrial firm’s IPO. In addition, they argue that there is greater REIT value 
uncertainty since price information is not produced for properties by liquid capital 
                                                 
1 According to Leland and Pyle (1977) intermediation reduces asymmetric information by providing an 
incentive to information producers, with economies of scale in the cost of information production, to 
produce information.  The incentive is created through the intermediary resolving the issues of 
appropriability of returns from “public” information and the lemons problem of information quality. 
 
However, it can be argued that intermediaries can actually increase asymmetric information levels through 
moral hazard issues and by holding opaque assets so that the increased risks to the enterprise brings about 
disintermediation through the violation of the conditions of intermediation theorized by Pyle (1971). 
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markets. If this is the case, then one would expect that on the date of the IPO the level of 
asymmetric information between parties who trade or wish to trade the security would be 
relatively high, especially when compared to that of a similar industrial IPO firm.  
Ling and Ryngaert (1997) argue that REIT IPO asset opacity is greater because of 
increased institutional investor interest in REITs during the period 1991 to 1994, greater 
use of self managed/self-advised (SMSA) structures, and the utilization of the complex 
Umbrella Partnership REIT (UPREIT) structure. If the arguments above hold, then the 
greater the differential in information about REIT IPO assets as compared to non-REIT 
IPOs, the greater the economic cost to the investors as they seek the equilibrium price in 
the price discovery process.  
 
1.2. Arguments for REIT IPO Asset Transparency 
 
The REIT IPO literature also includes articles arguing that REITs are more 
transparent than industrial firms. Ljungqvist (2005) argues that lower levels of 
asymmetric information between the issuer and the underwriter is indicated by less 
underpricing, a common metric in the IPO literature that proxies for asymmetric 
information. If the argument is true, industrial IPOs should have greater levels of 
underpricing when compared to the underpricing of REIT IPOs. Table 1.1 provides a list 






Table 1.1   Industrial and REIT IPO Underpricing 
 
Underpricing Period Studied Authors 
Panel A: Industrial IPOs  
   19 00 percent 1960–2004 Ljungqvist (2005) 
18.70 percent 1980–2003 Loughran and Ritter (2004) 
35.70 percent 1996–2000 Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003) 
   Panel B: REIT IPOs  
   3.60 percent 1991–1992 Ling and Ryngaert (1997) 
2.47 percent 1992–2001 Buttimer, Hyland, and Sanders (2005) 
4.19 percent 1993–2003 Highfield, Roskelley, and Steele (2009) 
   This table presents the mean underpricing or offer-to-close return, the period over which 
the return was estimated, and the work from which it was obtained. 
 
 
Since the empirical evidence presented in Table 1.1 indicates that REIT IPOs 
underpricing is substantially less than that of industrial IPOs, it is not problematic within 
the context of Ljungqvist (2005) to argue that REIT IPOs should have lower levels of 
asymmetric information as compared to that of industrial firm IPOs. In addition, 
Highfield, Roskelley, and Steele (2009) argue that asymmetric information should be 
minor because real estate investors use similar conventions to calculate vacancy and 
rental rates, frequent property value assessment by governmental agencies, and regulated, 
stable dividend payments. If investors value REIT IPOs with comparatively greater ease, 
then the associated asymmetric information cost should be relatively less for investors 
than for those investing in other common equities. 
 
1.3. The Importance of the Issue 
 
The asymmetric information content of IPOs has important implications. While 
this study does not focus on underpricing, this offer-to-close return is theoretically related 
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to the issue of asymmetric information. Rock (1986) demonstrates that underpricing is 
related to asymmetric information issues in that uninformed investors face the “winner’s 
curse” because of their informational disadvantage. By extension, Beatty and Ritter 
(1986) show that asymmetric information is directly related to underpricing, and Lowry, 
Officer, and Schwert (2006) hypothesize that firms with more difficult pricing processes 
should face greater initial return volatility. Lowry, Officer, and Schwert (2006) find that 
small, young, or high technology firms, those expected to have greater uncertainty about 
their assets at the IPO, have greater dispersion of returns. 
Assuming that issuers are rational and wish to mitigate uncertainty about their 
assets, then following Beatty and Ritter (1986) they face less underpricing at the offering, 
which ultimately means that they leave fewer IPO dollars on the table. The implication 
for underwriters regarding less asymmetry in IPOs is that they should obtain efficiencies 
in information generation and valuation which lead to lower compensation because of 
fewer information gathering costs. Finally, the implication for investors is that if a firm is 
less difficult to value, then the investors will also face fewer information gathering costs, 
which means that they can expect lower returns and less return volatility.  
 Since asymmetric information has such a widespread impact on the IPO process, 
this study not only extends the IPO literature by analyzing how asset transparency affects 
asymmetric information levels but also seeks to address the unsettled debate over whether 
REIT IPOs are comparatively more or less difficult to value. This study proposes to 
address these issues by measuring an asymmetric information proxy for equity REIT 
IPOs and comparing this measure with that of a matched group of industrial IPOs to 
determine if REIT IPOs are more or less informationally transparent. 
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1.4. The Importance of the Aftermarket 
 
If asymmetric information is present, it should show up not only in the primary 
market but also in the aftermarket as information from informed investors is disseminated 
through the price-discovery process which leads to a market equilibrium. As described by 
Lowry, Officer, and Schwert (2006), “trading resolves the firm’s uncertainty about the 
market’s aggregate demand.” 
The aftermarket environment, as described by Demsetz (1968) and Bagehot 
(1971) is typically composed of a specialist, informed traders, and uninformed traders. 
The specialist facilitates a market in a particular security or in a portfolio of securities and 
is responsible for the execution of transactions at any time that the exchange is open. 
Transactions can be matched when the specialist offers to buy (sell) shares that a trader 
wishes to sell (buy). The specialist handles orders from other brokerages and shares in 
their commissions or he buys (sells) for (from) his own inventory. His fee for standing 
ready to execute transactions comes from the spread—the difference between the bid and 
ask quotes. In essence, conditioned on the specialist’s observations from prior 
transactions, the bid-ask quotes straddle what he believes the next expected price should 
be. 
Brokers also delegate the transacting of a customer’s order to the specialist, or 
they trade directly on behalf of their clients. The specialist is compensated for taking a 
delegated trade for a broker through a sharing arrangement of the broker’s commission 
for the transaction. Also, other traders can compete with the specialist’s bid and ask 
quotes by placing limit orders. The specialist’s job can be summarized as that of 
maintaining an orderly market so that not only are sequential price changes kept 
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relatively close together but also the required volume for those price changes is available, 
thus keeping the market liquid for that particular security. While the specialist sees the 
flow of order demand for his security, he is unaware of the information obtained by other 
traders (brokers) and only becomes aware of it ex-post. 
Informed traders have private information about the firm and intend to use this 
information for profitable trades. The informed trader will trade only when it is beneficial 
to do so. Her profits come at the expense of the specialist.  
The uninformed trader simply wants to execute his transactions quickly. He has 
no private information and is not going to obtain private information. He willingly pays 
what the specialist charges: the bid-ask spread. 
As mentioned, only the informed investor obtains private information, even the 
specialist is unaware of it ex-ante the transaction. It is only ex-post that the specialist 
realizes that the previous transaction was made with an informed trader. The informed 
trader’s information indicates that the market maker has set the ask price too low or the 
bid price too high based upon on her information. This allows informed traders to 
profitably take advantage of the specialist. Once the market maker is informed, he 
realizes that the probability of future informed transactions has increased, so he widens 
the bid-ask spread to reduce the likelihood of similar informed transactions. The wider 
bid-ask spread not only reduces the likelihood of trading with the informed, but it also 
offsets his losses to them by providing additional profit from the uninformed investors 
who willing pay as long as they get an immediate transaction.  
In light of the microstructure activity described above, it is clear that the 
aftermarket price-discovery process reflects the cost of asymmetric information about a 
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particular security. Thus, informed investors of an IPO can not only profit in the primary 
market, but they can also find profitable trades in the aftermarket. These profitable trades, 
as mentioned above, require a premium to be charged to offset their cost to the specialist. 
If this premium and the other components of a specialist’s profit margin could be 
estimated, then the cost of asymmetric information or a proxy of the level of asymmetric 
information in a particular security could also be measured. 
The market microstructure literature offers a number of models that decompose 
the specialist’s bid-ask spread into its various components of inventory holding, order 
processing, and asymmetric information costs. This study proposes to use these models to 
proxy for the level of asymmetric information in REIT IPO transactions during the first 
45 and 60 days of trading and compare the adverse selection cost component of REIT 
IPOs to that of a matched group of industrial IPOs.  
Several studies have used this methodology to proxy and analyze asymmetric 
information in industrial firms and IPOs in general; however, little has been done within 
the REIT IPO literature. In one of the only studies on this subject, Glascock, Hughes, and 
Varshney (1998) use decomposition models in univariate analysis and the relative bid-ask 
spread in multivariate analysis to compare the implied asymmetric information level 
between the initial offerings of REITs, common stocks, and close-end funds.  
This study provides greater statistical power, accounts for the substantial changes 
to the industry over the last 16 years, and employs a more comprehensive model than that 
of Glascock, Hughes, and Varshney (1998) who analyze a sample of only 25 equity REIT 
IPOs from 1985 to 1988. In addition, the REIT industry has changed dramatically since 
1988. The Taxpayer Relief Act of 1993, the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, and the REIT 
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Modernization Act of 1999 have impacted the highly regulated industry by allowing 
greater opportunities for profit, greater revenue retention, greater management control, 
more institutional investors, and greater complexity of ownership structure. Thus, this 
study will be the first to analyze the comparative level of REIT IPO asymmetric 












Having established that the question of interest is REIT IPO opaqueness, the next 
step is to establish its place within the multilevel foundation of finance and real estate 
literature. The first layer presents the literature that first formalized asymmetric 
information. Addressed next is the unique perspective this study takes in analyzing 
information asymmetry when compared with the general IPO literature. This is followed 
by the development of asymmetric information measurement in the microstructure 
literature. Finally, the foundation is capped by the literature on IPOs that have used the 
microstructure methodologies for both comparative studies and time-related IPO analysis. 
 
2.1. The Foundation of Asymmetric Information Literature 
 
To set the stage for analyzing asymmetric information one must understand not 
only how it has been addressed in the literature but also how it has impacted asset 
valuation or pricing. First, asset transactions or transfers can be culminated only when a 
buyer and seller agree upon a clearing price that represents the value of the assets they are 
willing to exchange. If one party has private information regarding an asset, of which the 
other party to the transaction is unaware, then the information structure for the transaction 
is asymmetric and can have serious consequences for valuing the asset and obtaining a 
clearing price.  
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Asymmetry of information was formally introduced in Akerlof (1970) who 
demonstrates it within the paradigm of the car market. Purchasers of new cars know with 
some probability that their new car will be a lemon. After having owned the new car for a 
period of time, however, the lemon probability is revised based on their experience with 
the car. Since sellers know from their experience the quality of the car they are selling, 
they are more informed about its quality than are the potential buyers, who cannot 
distinguish whether the car is a lemon or not; thus, asymmetric information is born. The 
existence of such asymmetric information can have serious consequences. 
The market must clear both good and bad used cars at the same price, a price 
lower than that of a high quality car since the clearing price reflects the price for the 
average quality within the used vehicle market. Therefore, owners of good used cars are 
better off keeping their vehicles since they are unable to exchange the used cars for new 
cars or get the true value for them. The result is that the market of used cars collects more 
bad cars than good cars since owners of good cars would rather retain their more valuable 
cars for transportation. The market valuation process is repeated as the market 
composition changes, so that, ultimately, an entire collapse of the used car market takes 
place following a variation of Gresham’s Law in which bad cars drive good cars from the 
market because lemon cars sell for a price above their quality.  
The impact of asymmetric information on asset pricing that Akerlof (1970) 
explains affects any kind of asset transaction, whether it is for automobiles or financial 
securities, such as REIT securities or other common equities. Security markets, however, 
are unlikely to dissolve completely, as Akerlof (1970) argues, except when asymmetric 
information problems are severe. In addition, signaling and screening are forms of 
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information production used by firms and investors that mitigate the likelihood of market 
failure. However, this study’s objective is to attempt to measure the level of asymmetric 
information and does not explicitly seek to analyze its impact in the valuation process of 
REIT IPOs. 
 
2.2. Asymmetric Information and the General IPO Literature 
 
Asymmetry of information has been modeled for various relationships within the 
finance and economics literature, including: principal agent relationships, signaling 
within the labor market, signaling within entrepreneurial projects and intermediation, 
underpricing in initial public issues, and market microstructure. As noted by Jenkinson 
and Ljungqvist (2001), the initial public offering literature has generally dealt with 
asymmetric issues within the context of underpricing and has been considered in four 
major theories: (1) Rock’s (1986) “Winner’s Curse,” (2) signaling by Allen and 
Faulhaber (1989), Grinblatt and Hwang (1989), and Welch (1989), (3) issuer and 
underwriter principal-agent problems by Baron and Holmstrom (1980) and Baron (1982), 
and (4) information revelation by Benveniste and Spindt (1989).  
Underpricing is the return measured from the offer-price to the close-price on the 
first day of trading. As mentioned above, Ljungqvist (2005) argues that the positive 
relation between asymmetry of information and underpricing has been well established 
empirically; however, the amount of asymmetric information remains unknown. 
To answer the question of how much more asymmetric information is present in 
REIT initial public offerings as compared to that of other firms, one must use a method 
that provides a measurable proxy for asymmetry. In essence, if asymmetry of information 
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is an issue within the IPO process, then it is highly likely that the information production 
process does not completely eradicate asymmetry when the underwriter sets the offer-
price; moreover, asymmetry likely continues to be an issue through the close of the initial 
day of trading and beyond. Barry and Jennings (1993) and Bradley, Gonas, Highfield, 
and Roskelley (2008) argue that this is the case and demonstrate it by finding positive 
and significant open-to-close returns for industrial IPOs.  
 
2.3. Asymmetric Information and the Market Microstructure Literature 
 
Again, since the issue is how to measure asymmetric information that persists into 
the aftermarket, we must turn our attention to the market microstructure literature. 
Bagehot (1971) is the first to informally suggest a model of asymmetric information 
within the market microstructure in which the market maker faces three kinds of traders. 
The first is an informed trader with private information, the second has no private 
information and is motivated to trade only for the sake of “liquidity,” and the third is one 
who believes he has private information, but in reality, his information is public and has 
already been incorporated into the price of the security. The market maker always loses 
to the informed trader since she chooses to trade only when it is profitable to do so and 
refuses to trade when it is not profitable. Thus the market maker widens the bid-ask 
spread to minimize the number of losing transactions. The market maker’s business 
model for survival is simply to make up for losses from informed transactions through 
profitable transactions with the uninformed and misinformed traders.  
Bagehot (1971) assumes that uninformed liquidity traders have a high level of 
persistence in transacting even within the context of higher bid-ask spreads. Uninformed 
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traders are not totally insensitive to the round trip cost of transactions; however, since 
bid-ask spreads are inversely related to liquidity, there is a point at which the market 
maker could create an illiquid market by setting the minimal survival spread too high.2
Bagehot (1971) and Harris (2003) both note that market makers do not trade on 
fundamental information. Instead, they are very informed about market values and 
attempt to find an equilibrium price for the securities in which they specialize so that the 
buy-and-sell pressure points are balanced. Finally, Bagehot (1971) suggests that market 
makers are conduits of money flowing from the uninformed traders to the informed 
traders.  
 
While liquidity traders are sensitive to the bid-ask spread, they are willing to bear the 
explicit and/or opportunity costs of acquiring information contained in that news sources, 
such as the Wall Street Journal, Barron’s, Yahoo! Finance, and CNBC. This provides 
these so-called “informed” traders with information that they erroneously believe is not 
impounded into security prices, thereby encouraging them to engage in trades with the 
specialist. The additional volume of transactions these liquidity traders bring to the 
market helps reduce the bid-ask spread up to the point at which the market maker is still 
offsetting his losses to informed traders. 
As explanatory as Bagehot (1971) is regarding the interactions between specialists 
and traders, he does not develop a formal model that can be used to test hypotheses. 
Thus, a number of studies have modeled the relationships he suggests exist, and others 
have employed market microstructure data to test the hypotheses regarding the market 
interactions Bagehot (1971) so clearly described. Several of these are presented below. 
                                                 
2 From this point forward the study will consider a misinformed trader the same as an uninformed trader. 
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One of the first studies to formalize a model of asymmetric information using 
market microstructure data is Copeland and Galai (1983). They show that the market 
specialist faces informed and uninformed investors but are unable to differentiate 
between the two groups. The specialist learns about the investor’s private information 
only after executing a trade for a particular group. Thus, the specialist maximizes his 
revenue by establishing a bid-ask spread that is a trade-off between the expected losses he 
experiences when trading with informed investors and the profit he obtains from trading 
with uninformed traders. Uninformed investors are willing to pay the specialist because 
they value the immediacy of the transaction. 
Copeland and Galai (1983) demonstrate that the cost of providing bid-ask quotes 
is similar to writing a call option for the ask price and a put option for the bid. These 
options are written out of the money from the specialist’s informational perspective. 
Since uninformed investors are willing to execute the option out of the money because of 
their desire to complete the transaction immediately, the specialist is able to profit. He 
loses in transactions with the informed investor, however, since she will only execute the 
option when her private information about future states indicates that the options are 
really in the money. After the transaction, the specialist discovers the private information 
of the informed investor; thus, he increases the bid-ask spread to reflect the new 
information and reduces the likelihood of losing again to another informed investor. 
Thus, the bid-ask spread is impacted by the informational asymmetry between the 
specialists and informed investors.  
Glosten and Milgrom (1985) consider the asymmetric information that exists 
between specialists and informed investors, and that is revealed in that bid ask spread. 
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They demonstrate that the expected value of the asset from the view point of the 
specialist and the informed investor converges over a period of time. More importantly, 
they explain that the specialist widens the bid-ask spread when he either perceives the 
insider’s private information is superior or observes a greater proportion of informed 
investors to uninformed investors. 
 
2.4. Bid-Ask Spread Decomposition Literature 
 
While Copland and Galai (1983) and Glosten and Milgrom (1985) model 
asymmetric information and its relation to the bid-ask spread in the market microstructure 
literature, these studies do not explicitly measure the level of asymmetry. Fortunately, a 
number of empiricists have developed models that decompose the bid-ask spread into its 
various components that cover the specialist’s costs and profits.  
Glosten and Harris (1988) decompose the spread into two components. One is a 
transitory component that covers inventory costs, potential monopoly profits, and 
clearing fees. The second is the adverse selection component which represents additional 
profits that covers losses in transactions with informed investors. Their findings are 
unable to reject the hypothesis that NYSE common-stock spreads are positively related to 
adverse information. 
First, Stoll (1989) develops a more general model than that of Roll (1984) for the 
relation between quoted spreads and covariance of returns. Second, he finds that the 
relation between quoted spreads and covariance of returns differs depending on whether 
the returns are calculated using quotes or transactions prices. Third, he is able to use a 
unique data set from Nasdaq “National Market Securities.” He finds that the relation 
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between the serial covariance of transaction returns and the square of the quoted spread is 
significantly negative. Finally, he decomposes the bid-ask spread into the components of 
adverse selection costs, inventory holding costs, and order processing costs. He finds that 
the adverse information costs represent 43 percent of the spread; inventory holding costs 
represent 10 percent of the spread; and order processing represents 47 percent of the 
spread for Nasdaq firms in the fourth quarter of 1984. Again, the decomposition of the 
spread allows the analyst to measure the amount of the spread that the specialist uses to 
offset his losses to the informed investors.  
 
2.5. IPO and Comparative Analysis Asymmetric Information Literature 
 
Models that decompose the spread can be used to proxy for the various 
components of the bid-ask spread, including the asymmetric information component. 
Several studies have used this methodology in order to determine the comparative 
informational advantage of investors in differing industries, both within the IPO context 
and without, as well as analyze how adverse selection costs change over time after an 
IPO. 
The first example of how the decomposition models have been used to compare 
the adverse selection costs between different industry groups outside of the IPO 
environment is that of Flannery, Kwan, and Nimalendran (2004). They compare the 
opaqueness of bank holding company assets with that of a control group of other 
industrial firms. They use the quoted spread, effective spread, and the adverse selection 
cost estimates by George, Kaul, and Nimalendran (1991) and Lin, Sanger, and Booth 
(1995). They find that investors perceive Nasdaq bank holding company assets as 
18 
relatively more transparent when compared to their control group, but NYSE bank 
holding company assets have about the same transparency as their control group. 
 The second example of empirical work that uses decomposition models in 
industry-comparative studies outside of IPOs is that of Chen, Jiang, Kim, and McInish 
(2003). They compare the adverse selection costs for a sample of close-end funds and a 
matched sample of common stocks listed on the NYSE for the period 1994 to 1999 and 
find that close-end funds have significantly less adverse selection costs than a matched 
sample of common stocks. In addition, they find a significant and positive relation 
between investor sentiment and the adverse selection costs.  
One of the few studies to analyze asymmetric information costs for IPOs is Li, 
McInish, and Wongchoti (2005). They empirically test for a significant change in the 
level of adverse selection costs over the first 48 weeks of trading. They use the adverse 
selection cost estimation methods of Glosten and Harris (GH, 1988), Lin, Sanger, Booth 
(LSB, 1995), and Madhavan, Richardson, and Roomans (MRR, 1997) for the period 
1995 to 2000 and find less adverse selection costs directly following the IPO date, 
however, these costs increase through the 240 days of trade after the IPO. They argue that 
lower adverse selection costs found early in the IPO are caused by the informational 
advantage the underwriter has developed through the book-building process and 
restrictive agreements between underwriters and issuers in regard to informed trades and 
private information acquisition in the early stages of the IPO aftermarket. Consistent with 
Ljungqvist’s (2005) hypothesis, they find adverse selection costs are negatively related to 
underpricing and positively related to penalty bid expiration.  
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Finally, as mentioned previously, Glascock, Hughes, and Varshney (1998) is the 
only study that compares the adverse selection costs of REIT IPOs with a matched 
sample of industrial IPOs and closed-end fund IPOs. They examine 25 equity, 5 hybrid, 
and 20 mortgage REITs from 1985 to 1988. They regress the relative bid-ask spread on a 
binary variable to compare adverse selection costs across asset types, share price, trading 
volume, and return variance. They find that REIT IPOs, whether equity, hybrid, or 
mortgage, have higher measures of adverse selection cost than that of the industrial firm 
IPOs. Equity REITs have the highest level of adverse selection costs; however, they 
argue that the differences in asymmetric information are caused by differences in REIT 
asset holdings not REIT structure. Thus, in their estimation, bid-ask spreads are no 
different than that of common stocks. 
A note of interest is that Glascock, Hughes, and Varshney (1998) use the relative 
bid-ask spread as the sole dependent variable rather than use the asymmetric information 
component estimates of Glosten and Harris (1988) and Lin, Sanger, and Booth (1995). In 
addition, they commingle all REIT types to determine whether REIT assets, defined 
broadly, are more or less opaque. The commingling of REIT types is likely because of 
their small sample of various REITs. Given the difference in risk across REIT investment 
foci, this obscures the results that might be obtained if only the equity REITs were 
considered in comparison to industrial IPOs. Also, they use daily return variance, which 












As mentioned previously, Glascock, Hughes, and Varshney (1998) is the only 
paper to analyze the difference in asymmetric information between REIT IPOs and 
industry IPOs in the 1985 to 1988 period. However, the REIT industry environment has 
changed a great deal since the 1985 to 1988 period. First, from 1990 to 2008 REIT 
equity-market capitalization grew from $8.7 billion to $192 billion, with most of that 
growth coming from equity REITs that grew from $5.6 billion to $176 billion in market 
capitalization (NAREIT, 2009). Additionally, the REIT industry saw legislative changes, 
a move toward self-management/self-advisement, greater institutional ownership, and 
new operating structures. Some have argued that these changes empowered management 
to actively pursue returns, which likely increased return volatility, rather than remain 
tranquil caretakers of REIT assets. Greater management discretion over operations and 
complex structures would likely make REIT valuation more difficult, and yet greater 
institutional ownership should have brought about greater monitoring, more liquid 







3.1.1. UPREIT Structure 
 
One of the first changes to the REIT environment in the 1990s was the 
introduction of the Umbrella Partnership Real Estate Investment Trust (UPREIT) 
structure. The Taubman Centers IPO was the first to seek and obtain approval of UPREIT 
structure from the IRS in 1992 (Fickes, 2006). The Umbrella Partnership REIT is created 
essentially by two kinds of partners who come together to form an operating partnership 
(OP). The first partner is represented by the various property owners who exchange real 
assets for OP units and/or cash. The second partner is the newly formed REIT, which 
makes a public offering in order to raise capital that is then contributed to the OP in 
exchange for a general-partnership interest in the form of OP units. The benefit of the 
structure is that the original real-asset owners can exchange their OP units for an agreed-
upon ratio of shares in the REIT or cash when they are ready to “cash out.” Most 
importantly, former real-asset owners can combine their holdings while deferring capital 
gains. The capital gains will only be realized when the OP units are exchanged for REIT 
shares or cash.  
While the UPREIT structure is beneficial to the original real-asset owners, the 
drawback is that it inserts another layer of ownership and corporate governance structure 
between the REIT shareholders and management. This additional layer of structure can 
foster conflicts between REIT shareholders and OP partners, since these investors may 
have different agendas for the real assets. For example, one group of investors may find 
near-term disposal of real assets or a merger advantageous, while the other group faces 
serious tax consequences and would rather delay such deals to a later period (Fickes, 
2006; Chan, Erickson, and Wang, 2003; and Garrigan and Parsons, 1998). 
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The increased complexity of the UPREIT structure may also contribute to greater 
uncertainty in asset values as compared to that of simpler REIT structures observed prior 
to the 1990s; however, the structure has been well received. For example in 1995, 
UPREITs represented 27.4 percent of the total number of public REIT structure types and 
this increased to 46.8 percent in 2000, see Figure 3.1.1. (Chan, Erickson, and Wang, 
2003). 
Most of the changes for UPREITs took place between 1995 and 1998, such that 
the proportion of UPREITs to the total public REIT structure types varied between 46.6 
percent and 44.9 percent for 1998 and 2000, respectively. The total number of REITs 
during that time frame decreased from 237 in 1995 to 233 in 2000. During the 1995 to 
2000 period the traditionally-structured REITs declined from 72.6 percent of the total 
public structure types in 1995 to 47.7 percent in 2000. The remaining REITs use a 
variation of the UPREIT structure called the DownREIT, which grew from 4.9 percent of 
the total public REIT structure types in 1997 to 7.4 percent in 2000. The DownREIT 
structure is created when a currently-operating REIT contributes cash or real assets to an 
operating partnership, which in essence becomes a subsidiary UPREIT, in exchange for 
OP units (Garrigan and Parsons, 1998). Other investors also contribute cash or real assets 
to the operating partnership in exchange for OP units, which can be exchanged at some 





Figure 3.1.1.   Change in REIT Operating Structures: 1995 to 2000  
 
Chart based on data from Table 3.4., pg 51 Chan, Erickson, and Wang (2003). Represents REITs for which 
they had public information regarding operating structure types. 
 
 
3.1.2. Taxpayer Relief Act of 1993 
 
Part of REIT growth can be attributed to the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1993 
(TRA93), which increased the institutional holdings of REITs and management 
flexibility. For example, Chan, Leung, and Wang (1998) document that the average 
percentage of institutional holdings for REITs was 12 percent in 1986, 14 percent in 
1989, and 12 percent again in 1992; however, the holdings increased in 1993 to 17 
percent, 26 percent in 1994, and 30 percent in 1995. These changes were brought about 
by the revision of the 5/50 rule in the tax law, which allowed five or fewer individual 
investors to cumulatively own no more than 50 percent of the outstanding shares and was 
instituted so as to ensure that small investors would be able to participate in real asset 
investment. 
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While real assets provide an excellent match of long-term investments with a 
pension fund’s long-term obligations, the prior tax law made REITs an uninteresting 
investment choice for pensions because of the limited investment opportunity available 
(Walton, 1994). The Taxpayer Relief Act of 1993 allowed the beneficiaries to be 
considered individual shareholders of the REIT rather than of the pension fund itself. 
However, the revised tax code limited pension ownership to only 25 percent. Still, the 
change opened up REITs to many large institutional investors.  
In addition to lowering ownership barriers, TRA93 removed restrictions on 
income that would have previously been considered taxable for pensions under the 
Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1973. These restrictions 
included real estate purchased through seller financing, real estate purchased with 
participation loans, and real estate lease backs to the seller, which would have made 
REITs less interesting to pensions as well (Walton, 1994).  
Additional support for the changes in the REIT industry around the time of the 
Taxpayer Relief Act of 1993 is contained in the empirical study of Clayton and 
MacKinnon (2000). They analyze the change in the inverse-liquidity parameter of Kyle 
(1985) while controlling for the market makers’ fixed-cost components of the bid-ask 
spread, as noted in Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996). They find that the inverse-
liquidity parameter for REIT securities declined significantly from the 1993 period to the 
1996 period, indicating greater liquidity, less asymmetric information, and increased 
market depth. Additionally, the self-managed/self-advised REIT management structures 
drove the significant improvements in liquidity. Further analysis of the changes in 
volume and prices, when subdivided by transaction size, indicate, increased market 
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depth, which they argue resulted from amplified institutional ownership (uninformed 
traders) of REITs. This liquidity improvement provided the market cover informed 
traders needed to increase their activity and camouflage their transactions. They note that 
their findings seem incongruous in that an increase in informed trading indicates greater 
asymmetric information issues, while at the same time, they find that overall REIT 
liquidity improved and asymmetric information issues declined over the 1993 to 1996 
period. They reconcile these opposed findings with the argument that institutional 
investment provided such an improvement in market depth that it more than offset the 
increased asymmetric information from informed trading. The net effect was greater 
liquidity. 
 
3.1.3. Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 
 
The next major change in the REIT environment was brought about by the 
Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 (TRA97), which contained revisions that gave REITs more 
flexibility and reduced the risk of losing their favorable tax status. One of the first items 
addressed was the gross-income tests. Prior to the act three tests helped determine if a 
firm could be considered a REIT: (1) 75 percent of the firm’s gross income must come 
from passive real estate sources, (2) 95 percent of the gross income must come from 
passive real estate, represented by the 75 percent already mention above, and an 
additional 20 percent represented by passive income in the form of dividends and interest 
as seen in Figure 3.1.3., and (3) a maximum of 30 percent of gross income, which, in 
essence, is part of the 75 percent basket above and could come from sales of securities 
held less than a year or real estate held for less than four years. The remaining five 
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percent of gross income represented income that was “disqualified” or non-restricted 





Figure 3.1.3.   Gross-Income Test Percentages. 
 
Chart based on information from Garrigan and Parsons (1998). 
 
 
Under the tax law enacted in 1986, REITs could charge for customary services 
that were not rental fees, such as lawn care, and this income was considered “qualified” 
income in that it satisfied the gross-income tests. Yet, non-customary service fees, such 
as truck rental, concierge services, or tennis instruction, were considered “disqualified” 
and were placed in the five percent basket representing non-restricted income. These non-
customary fees also disqualified the rental income from the properties for which the 
services had been rendered. This limited REITs from offering many of these services 
because of the potential loss of REIT status, placing them at a competitive disadvantage 
to other real estate firms since they could not offer tenants the same amenities. Thus, 
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TRA97 allowed REITs to retain their tax favored status, and take advantage of the 
opportunities to generate revenues of up to one percent of the REIT’s gross income from 
non-customary tenant services. The non-customary revenues were calculated at a rate of 
at least 150 percent of the direct costs to provide the services. While the fees were still 
considered impermissible income in the context of the income tests, the new law now 
considered the underlying rental-property income as qualifying for the gross-income 
tests, so long as the fees did not exceed the one-percent limit of the REIT’s gross income. 
If the limit was exceeded, then the underlying rental revenue would be disqualified from 
the gross-income tests (Drake, Messina, and Wilburn, 1998; Edwards, 1997; and 
NAREIT, 1999). Thus, the legislative revision opened up competitive opportunities to 
REITs and provided limited diversification to their income streams while retaining their 
preferential-tax status.  
The Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 also provided REITs more options in that they 
could retain capital gains for future investments. The revision removed the disincentive 
of retaining long-term capital gains generated during the year because of double taxation 
to the REIT shareholders on the gains. The revised law provided tax credits to the 
shareholders; thus tax is paid only at the REIT level freeing REITs to retain more income. 
In addition, TRA97 revoked the 30 percent gross-income test. This allowed REIT 
management more flexibility in capitalizing on profitable sales of assets, so long as the 
assets were not considered dealer property or real assets held for re-sale in the ordinary 
course of business. In cases of dealer-property sales, an excise tax of 100 percent of any 
profits was retained in the new law. Since it would be quite costly for a transaction to be 
misclassified as dealer property in a sale, a safe-harbor feature was include that 
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eliminated the excise tax from transactions: (1) seven properties could be sold per year 
and (2) the cumulative value of properties sold could total no more than 10 percent of the 
firm’s cumulative tax basis. In addition, should a government agency enforce its right of 
eminent domain and require a REIT to sell an asset, then that sale could be excluded from 
the allowable seven transactions.  
Next, the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 reduced the threat that a REIT would lose 
its tax status because of slow paper work in regard to the 5/50 rule. The IRS requires that 
the REIT send a demand letter within 30 days of the REIT’s fiscal year end to specific 
shareholders of record requesting who the beneficial shareholders, or “real” shareholders, 
are since the shareholder records indicate a potential street-name registration (Edwards 
1997, Shaw, Rep. 1997, and U.S. Securities and Exchange 2008). A violation under the 
old law would have disqualified the REIT from preferential tax status, even though the 
5/50 rule had been met. This was amended so that, instead of losing its tax status, the 
REIT was penalized $25,000, assuming that it was unaware of any 5/50 rule violations. If 
it was aware of 5/50 rule violations, and the delay was intentional, then the penalty was 
$50,000; yet, tax status was still protected. Thus, the risk of losing preferred tax status 
over neglected paperwork was eliminated. 
Two other changes were made by the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 regarding 
accounting issues. TRA97 (1) allowed new REITs to account for first year distributions 
as coming from prior accumulated earnings, thus making the retention of favorable tax 
status easier, and (2) provided management with the option of deciding whether to 
distribute accrued income to meet the 95 percent rule, or pay taxes on it rather than 
distribute cash.  
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REITs were also given the ability to expand. Prior law required a REIT to own a 
subsidiary for its entire life; however, the revised law allows any company, regardless of 
whether it has been owned by the REIT its entire life, to qualify as a wholly-owned 
subsidiary as long as the REIT has 100 percent ownership. This allowed for easier 
acquisitions and mergers with other firms.  
Finally, the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 allowed REITs more flexibility in 
managing their exposure to interest rate and currency risk. The law expanded the 
qualified-income definition to include not only variable-rate hedge income but also 
income from all hedging instruments related to REIT real-asset liabilities; thus, allowing 
these funds to satisfy the 95 percent gross-income test (Drake, Messina, and Wilburn, 
1998; Edwards, 1997; Shaw, Rep., 1997). This provided management more flexibility in 
choosing the kinds of instruments they could use to hedge interest rate and currency risk 
without running into problems with the REIT’s tax status.  
The Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 impacted the information asymmetry of REITs. 
Ott and Van Ness (2002) empirically tested the hypothesis that the adverse selection 
component of the bid-ask spread for REITs increased after August 5, 1997, the date the 
Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 was signed into law. They estimate the adverse selection 
component 30 days before and after using three different methods: George, Kaul, and 
Nimalendran (1991); Lin, Sanger, and Booth (1995); and Madhaven, Richardson, and 
Roomans (1997). Ott and Van Ness (2002) find that the estimated adverse selection 
component from all three methods is significantly greater after the Taxpayer Relief Act 
of 1997 went into law. They argue that market makers increased this component of the 
bid-ask spread in order to offset potential losses resulting from transactions with superior 
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analysts making informed trades at the expense of the market maker. However, the 
argument could be made that the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 resulted in greater 
transparency since more investors were now informed thus necessitating the change in 
the adverse selection component.  
 
3.1.4. REIT Modernization Act of 1999 
 
The next legislation to impact the REIT environment was the REIT 
Modernization Act of 1999 (RMA99), which took effect in 2001. As in the 1986 and 
1997 legislative acts, one of the key issues addressed was the generation of alternative 
sources of REIT income. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86) allowed REITs to 
generate income from customary services, such as cable television and lawn care, which 
were considered qualified revenue or rental income for the gross-income test but 
disqualified non-customary service income and the related underlying rental income. 
Next, the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 was passed and broadened; yet again, the kinds of 
income a REIT could generate by allowing limited amounts of revenue to be generated 
from non-customary tenant services, such as those given by a concierge or tennis 
instructor (Edwards, 1999).  
As REITs took advantage of these opportunities to expand services to tenants, 
REITs found that not only tenants, but also non-tenants demanded the quality customary 
and non-customary services offered. In fact, the opportunities to generate service income 
far exceeded a REITs ability to take advantage of them, since this income was limited to 
five percent of gross income. Thus, REITs were handicapped in their ability to maximize 
shareholder wealth. 
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In order to provide clarity regarding how REITs solved the dilemma above, 
consideration should be given to REIT asset rules. Just as a firm must meet the gross-
income tests to retain REIT status, they must also satisfy certain asset tests. Three of the 
rules presented below have their origin in the Investment Company Act of 1940 
legislation for mutual funds: (1) a minimum of 75 percent of total asset value of a REIT 
must be invested in real assets, cash and marketable securities, and government 
securities; (2) the other 25 percent of total assets may be invested in other securities or 
instruments; however, only five percent of total assets may be invested in any one 
security issuer; and (3) REITs were limited to holding a maximum of ten percent of the 
voting securities of an issuer (Garrigan and Parsons, 1998).  
In light of the assets tests, an early solution was developed in which the REITs 
created and owned the non-voting shares of C corporations, known as third-party 
subsidiaries (TPSs), while REIT management and other individuals owned the voting 
securities. The TPSs provided services, such as lawn maintenance or management of joint 
venture projects, to tenants and non-tenant third parties, and then remitted the income 
back to the REIT in the form of dividends, which passed the 95 percent gross-income 
test. 
However, TPSs were cumbersome vehicles through which to recognize the 
additional revenues since REITs had no control (held non-voting shares), were restricted 
in the amount of ownership, and required the sharing of income with other voting 
shareholders. In addition, any non-customary service income the TPSs generated above 
the one percent limit resulted in the underlying rental income of the REIT being 
disqualified from the gross-income test. 
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Thus, a better way to generate and manage additional revenue was part of the 
impetus in the REIT industry’s lobbying the United States Congress to pass the REIT 
Modernization Act of 1999, which allowed REITs to own 100 percent of a taxable REIT 
subsidiary’s (TRS) outstanding shares. In addition, TRSs were able to charge for both 
customary and non-customary services to tenants and non-tenants for development 
projects, bulk-purchasing discounts, concierge services, and joint ventures to provide 
renters insurance without disqualifying the underlying rental income. However, 
legislators made sure REITs could not overly reduce a TRS’s taxable income, and thus 
limited the rental income and debt service TRSs could remit to their REIT parents. To 
ascertain that REITs maintained a real-estate focus, the size of TRSs was limited to 20 
percent of the REIT’s total assets. The legislation also regulated intra-company 
transactions, so that any transactions that transpired between the REITs, TRSs, or the 
tenants at less than arm’s length would be taxed at 100 percent. Other limiting items 
were: TRSs could not operate lodging or healthcare facilities, and REITs could own a 
maximum of ten percent of the voting or value of any other type of C corporation 
securities not issued by a TRS. These changes were substantive enough to provide REIT 
management the opportunity to maintain better control of the quality of tenant services, 
enhance renter loyalty, and maximize REIT shareholder wealth through additional cash 
flows. 
RMA99 also improved a REIT’s ability to manage its assets through a reduction 
in the required portion of income to be distributed. The proportion of income distributed 
declined from 95 percent to 90 percent providing REITs additional funds to reinvest in 
profitable opportunities and enhance future returns. 
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The market perceived these changes as a positive sign for the REIT industry, as 
documented empirically by Howe and Jain (2004) who analyze the REIT Modernization 
Act of 1999’s impact on shareholder wealth and systematic risk. Using an event-study 
methodology to analyze six separate events during the legislative process of the law, they 
find that the introduction of the bill to the House of Representatives on April 29, 1999 
resulted in positive and significantly abnormal returns over a three-day-event window. 
They also find systematic risk declined significantly between 2000 and 2001, when the 
bill went into effect. The findings support the idea that investors perceived the legislation 
to positively impact REIT valuation.  
 
3.2. Contribution 
 In addition to the major changes in the REIT industry since the study by 
Glascock, Hughes, and Varshney (1998) outlined above, there are other major issues 
regarding their study that make this proposed study distinct. First, as previously 
mentioned, Glascock, Hughes, and Varshney (1998) use a small sample of 25 equity 
REITs. As noted above, equity REIT IPOs exploded in number since that time; thus a 
much larger sample is now available. In addition, the model used by Glascock, Hughes, 
and Varshney (1998) commingles equity, hybrid, and mortgage REITs in determining 
whether REITs have more or less asymmetric information than industrial firms and close-
end funds. This study seeks to focus only on equity REITS, so as not to add potential 
noise from other REIT types. 
The Glascock, Hughes, and Varshney (1998) model primarily uses aftermarket 
variables to explain asymmetric information; however, the literature of initial public 
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offerings and the market microstructure literature indicate that there are other variables 
that should be considering when investigating asymmetric information at the IPO stage. 
These variables will be described in more depth in Chapter IV. Finally, the Glascock, 
Hughes, and Varshney (1998) model uses the relative bid-ask spread as the dependent 
variable. While it implicitly contains asymmetric information, the relative bid-ask spread 
does not offer a specific measure as does the variables from the decomposition models. 
 
3.3. Hypothesis 
This study seeks to analyze the issue using specific proxies for adverse selection 
costs and controlling for the relevant factors in regard to asymmetric information levels. 
It is quite clear that the REIT industry has changed substantially since the 1980s and that 
adverse selection costs have likely changed as well. Therefore, it seems appropriate to re-
examine and extend the literature regarding REIT IPO informational transparency with a 
unique methodology. As mentioned previously, this study proposes that REITs are 
unique firms that should offer a level of operating transparency not typically found in 
industrial firms. REITs are highly regulated, have tangible assets which are valued by 
governmental agencies and others, use conventional industry methods for estimating 
vacancy and rental rates, have predictable cash-flow streams, maintain stable dividends, 
and are held by a large number of institutional investors. Thus the null and alternative 
hypotheses of this study are as follows: 
 
H0: REIT IPOs have the same transparency as other industrial IPOs. Thus, as 
measured by the relative spread or adverse selection component, equity REIT 
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IPOs have the same level of asymmetric information as industrial IPOs during the 
first 45-day and 60-day window of trade. 
 
HA: REIT IPOs are more opaque or transparent than other industrial IPOs. Thus, 
as measured by the relative spread or adverse selection component, equity REIT 
IPOs have more or less asymmetric information than do industrial IPOs during the 
first 45-day and 60-day window of trade. 
 
3.4. Data 
Equity REIT and non-REIT IPOs are collected from the Thompson Financial 
SDC Platinum New Issues Database (SDC) for the period January 1, 1993 to December 
31, 2007. The data sources for the variables can also be seen in Table 3.1. and are as 
follows: Thompson Financial SDC Platinum New Issues Database (SDC); SNL REIT 
Datasource (SNL); Compustat; NYSE Trade and Quote Database (TAQ); Center for 
Research of Security Prices (CRSP); the SEC’s Electronic Data, Gathering, Analysis, and 
Retrieval System (EDGAR); and Carter and Manaster (CM, 1990) lead underwriter 
reputation rankings and number of IPOs from Jay Ritter’s website at the University of 
Florida (Ritter, 2008). Table 3.1 also lists both the endogenous and exogenous variables 
that will proxy for asymmetric information and its determinants. Each of the variables is 
listed for the following categories: company characteristics, offering characteristics, 
certification, and aftermarket (Jenkinson and Ljungqvist, 2001; and Van Ness, Van Ness, 
and Warr, 2001).  
The initial equity REIT IPO sample contains 101 initial public offerings and was 
reduced to a final sample of 78 IPOs, of which 73 firms were listed on the NYSE and five 
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firms were listed on the Nasdaq. The final sample eliminates close-end funds, issues of 
class B securities, and hybrid and mortgage REITs due to their unique risk 
characteristics. Additionally, several REIT IPOs are dropped because of data availability 
regarding the variables of total debt and total assets for the fiscal year end after the initial 
offering. Further, some REIT firms are eliminated because of firm matching issues 
between SNL REIT Datasource and SEC’s EDGAR database. 
To provide a set of non-REIT firms to match with the 78 REIT IPOs, the initial 
opportunity set of 6,280 non-REIT IPOs is reduced to 293 NYSE and 1,654 Nasdaq 
industrial firm IPOs for the years in which there were REIT IPOs on the NYSE and 
Nasdaq exchanges. This opportunity set of industrial firm IPOs eliminates foreign firms 
as designated by the state of issuance, American depositary receipts (ADRs), American 
depositary securities (ADSs), firms having an SIC code in the 6000’s, firms having SIC 
codes of 619A or 619B, firms having an SIC code in the 9000’s, unit trust securities, 
class B issues, beneficial interests, enhanced-income securities, income-deposit 
securities, limited-partnership securities, firms not reporting assets before the offer, firms 
with an offer-price less than $5.00, firms with more than one issuance where the primary 
issue was unclear, and non-primary issues. In addition, the sample of industrial IPOs is 
limited to firms that went public in the same years that equity REITs went public. 
The REIT IPO sample set is matched with the non-REIT IPOs based on firms 
having a similar year of issue and a similar exchange listing. Three samples are created 
from the firms meeting these requirements so that the first sample is based on firms 
having a minimum absolute difference in asset size, the second sample is based on firms 
having the same Carter and Manaster (1990) underwriter rankings as provided on Jay 
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Ritter’s website (Ritter, 2008), and the third sample is based on firms having a minimum 
absolute difference in the partial-adjustment measure, the percentage change between the 
offer-price and the midpoint of the original file range. 
 
3.5. Adverse Selection Components 
 
 This study is unique in the REIT IPO literature in that it proxies the level of 
asymmetric information that is contained in the IPOs by using adverse selection cost 
components. These measures reflect the specialist’s profit margin required to cover the 
cost of trading with informed traders. The Glosten and Harris (1988) method estimates 
the adverse selection component as a percentage of the quoted spread The Lin, Sanger, 
and Booth (1995) method estimates the adverse selection component as a fraction of half 
of the effective spread. These two estimation methods are selected since Van Ness, Van 
Ness, and Warr (2001) find that they perform favorably when compared to other 
methods. 
 
3.5.1. Glosten and Harris (1988) Adverse Selection Component 
 
 The Glosten and Harris (1988) adverse selection component is estimated using 
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression for each firm i, and is expressed below: 
( ) ( ) 110111101 −−−−− −++++−+−=− tttttttttttttt rreVQzQzVQVQcQQcPP , (1) 
 
where Pt is the observed transaction price at time t for firm i. The transaction indicator Qt 
is used to classify Pt as taking place at either the bid or ask such that Qt = +1 indicates a 
buy (ask) and Qt = -1 for a sell (bid). Vt is the number of shares traded in transaction t for 
firm i. The arrival of public information is represented by et at time t for firm i, and rt 
represents the rounding error found in Pt at time t because of the use of discrete one-
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eighth values rather than the unobserved price. Zt = z0 + z1Vt represents one-half the 
adverse selection cost component of the bid-ask spread and is the result of the specialist’s 
change in expectations conditional to an order arrival. It represents a permanent change 
because of revised expectations, such that buy orders cause “true” prices to rise by Zt 
while sell orders cause “true” prices to fall by Zt. Alternatively, Ct = c0 +c1Vt represents 
one-half of the transitory cost component of the bid-ask spread. Thus, Z0 = 2(z0 + z1Vt) 
represents the total adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread, and C0 = 2(c0 + 
c1Vt) represents the total transitory component of the bid-ask spread as clarified in Chen, 
Jiang, Kim, and McInish (2003). 
 The adverse selection component as a percentage of the quoted spread can then be 
estimated as follows: 
( )











= . (2) 
 The bid (ask) classification Qt will be done using the Lee and Ready (1991) 
method where trades are classified based on the current quote if the quote is older than 
five seconds and on the previous quote if the current quote is less than five seconds old. 
Transactions will be classified buys for the relation between the transaction price and the 
quote in effect if the transaction takes place above the ask, equal to the ask, inside the ask 
but closer to the ask, and in the middle of spread and indicated as a buy by the tick test. 
Alternatively, transactions will be considered sells for the relation between transaction 
price and the current quote in effect if the transaction takes place below the bid, equal to 
the bid, inside the spread but closer to the bid, and in the middle of the spread and 
indicated a sell by the tick test. The tick test is composed of four categories: uptick, 
39 
downtick, zero uptick, and zero downtick. The uptick (downtick) is applied if the current 
transaction is higher (lower) than the previous transaction and indicates a buy (sell). If the 
price is the same as the previous price, then it is a zero tick and the previous transaction 
change is used to determine a zero uptick (zero downtick) indicating again a buy (sell). 
 
3.5.2. Lin, Sanger, Booth (1995) Adverse Selection Component 
 
 The Lin, Sanger, Booth (1995) adverse selection component is estimated by a 
regression of the following equation: 
11 ++ +=− tttt ezQQ λ , (3) 
 
where Qt is the natural logarithm of the quote midpoint at time t. Pt is the natural 
logarithm of the trade price at time t, and zt is the difference between the natural 
logarithm of Pt and the natural logarithm of Qt. Finally, et+1 is the random error term. 
Similar to Glosten and Harris’s (1988) Zi, λ represents the adverse selection component 
as a fraction of half of the effective spread and the market maker’s quote revision because 
of their perception of how informative the previous trader was in the prior transaction. 
 
3.6. Descriptive Statistics 
 The descriptive statistics are presented in Tables 3.2 and 3.3. Table 3.2 contains 
the statistics for firms for which the relative spread (RELSPREAD), Glosten and Harris 
(GH, 1988) and Lin, Sanger, and Booth (LSB, 1995), are calculated over a 45-day 
window. Firms, on average, financed approximately 38.6 percent of their assets with 
debt. The average firm has assets of approximately $554 million prior to going public. 
The underwriters underprice the average issue in the sample by approximately 7.70 
percent, and arrive at the final offer-price, partially adjusting from the midpoint -2.79 
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percent. The average number of initial public offerings in a given year is approximately 
448. Venture capitalists back approximately 11 percent of the firms. On average, the 
underwriters taking these firms public have a Carter and Manaster (1990) ranking of 
approximately 8.4 out of a scale of 1 to 9. The average daily price is $18.84 and the 
average daily volume is approximately 223,000 over the 45-day window after the firm 
went public. The average daily volume represents 2.52 percent of the shares offered in 
the public offering. The average relative spread or the proportion of the bid-ask spread to 
the midpoint of the quote is 1.22 percent. The proportion of the spread allocated to cover 
the specialist’s cost of trading with informed traders is 14.47 percent on average as 
measured by the Glosten and Harris (1988) method and 31.21 percent as measured by the 
Lin, Sanger, and Booth (1995) method during the 45-day window. 
 A comparison of REIT IPOs to industrial IPOs for the 45 day window can be 
made by reviewing Panels B and C of Table 3.2. On average, REITs finance 
approximately 42 percent of their assets with debt versus only 37 percent for non-REIT 
IPOs. REIT IPOs are smaller having approximately $415 million in prior to offer assets 
versus approximately $642 million in prior to offer assets for non-REIT IPO firms. On 
average, REIT IPOs are less underpriced having a mean of 6.37 percent of underpricing 
as compared to a mean of 8.54 percent of underpricing for industrial IPOs. On average, 
underwriters partially adjust REIT IPOs lower in that they have partial adjustments of -
3.93 percent versus partial adjustments of -2.07 percent for non-REIT IPOs. REIT IPOs 
usually go public without venture capital-backing, while 18 percent of industrial IPOs 
have venture capitalist-backing. REIT IPOs have average daily prices of approximately 
$21 per share and average daily volumes of approximately 180,000 shares versus 
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industrial IPOs, which have approximately $18 per share and 250,000 shares, 
respectively.  
Table 3.3 contains the descriptive statistics for the variables of the IPO firms 
measured for a 60-day window. The average firm’s daily price over the 60 days is 
$19.00, and the average daily transaction volume is approximately 190,000 shares. The 
proportion of the average daily volume to the number of shares issued is 2.15 percent. 
The average relative spread or the proportion of the bid-ask spread to the midpoint of the 
quote is 1.24 percent. Market makers, on average, consider 15.86 percent of the quoted 
spread sufficient to cover the cost of trading against informed traders using the Glosten 
and Harris (1988) method or 31.64 percent of the effective spread using the Lin, Sanger, 
and Booth (1995) method.  
 A comparison between Panels B and C of Table 3.3 indicates that REIT IPOs 
have an average daily price of approximately $21 per share and an average daily 
transaction volume of approximately 152,000 shares. The non-REIT IPO’s post 
approximately $18 per share and 215,000 shares of daily volume. Both REIT IPOs and 
industrial IPOs seem to experience lower daily transaction volume when the 45-day and 
60-day windows are compared. 
 Finally, a brief note is in order for the GH and LSB adverse selection components 
in Panel A of Table 3.2 and Panel A of Table 3.3. These descriptive statistics are for 
those firms for which GH and LSB are within the theoretical bounds of 0 to 100 percent 




3.7. Univariate Analysis of Asymmetric Information Component Means  
 The next most important issue for this study is whether there is any difference 
between REIT IPO and industrial IPO measures of asymmetric information content. 
Table 3.4 compares REIT IPOs with non-REIT IPOs for each time window and analyzes 
the three measures used in this study of relative spread, Glosten and Harris (GH, 1988) 
and Lin, Sanger, and Booth (LSB, 1995).  
An examination of the relative spreads over the 1993 to 2007 period shows 0.95 
percent for REIT IPOs for both the 45-day and 60-day windows, as compared to 
Glascock, Hughes, and Varshney’s (1998) 2.66 percent for the 1985 to 1988 period over 
a 250-day trading window. Industrial IPOs post an average relative spread of 1.40 percent 
for the 45-day window and 1.42 percent for the 60-day window, as compared to 1.98 
percent found by Glascock, Hughes, and Varshney (1998) for a 250-day trading window. 
REIT IPOs have significantly less relative spread for both the 45- and the 60-day 
windows, which indicates, at least preliminarily, that REITs have less asymmetric 
information content as proxied by this metric. This finding is in opposition to Glascock, 
Hughes, and Varshney (1998), who find that the relative spread for their 25 equity REIT 
IPOs is significantly greater than that of their sample of common stocks. 
The next measure of asymmetric information, the GH measure, is 11.82 percent 
and 13.32 percent for REIT IPOs for the 45- and 60-day windows, respectively, for the 
period of 1993 to 2007. Industrial IPOs have a GH measure of 16.17 percent for the 45-
day window and 17.51 percent for the 60-day window. Both REIT IPOs and non-REIT 
IPOs GH post measures considerably less than the 38.9 percent estimated by Van Ness, 
Van Ness, and Warr (2001) for 856 stocks during the period of April 1999 to June 1999. 
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In addition, the findings in Table 3.4 for GH are greater than the 5.61 percent found by 
Li, McInish, and Wongchoti (2005) who estimate over the first week of an IPO for a 
sample of 1726 IPO firms during the period 1995 to 2000. An analysis of the difference 
in means shows that REIT IPOs have a significantly lower GH adverse selection cost 
component of -4.34 percent as compared to industrial IPOs over the 45-day window and 
a significant -4.19 percent for the 60-day window. This indicates initially that specialists 
build in a lower asymmetric information profit margin for REIT IPOs as compared to 
non-REIT IPOs using the Glosten and Harris (1988) metric.  
The final measure of asymmetric of information—the Lin, Sanger and Booth 
(LSB, 1995) metric—indicates that REIT IPOs have 29.37 percent and 31.26 percent of 
their effective spreads allocated to cover the costs of trading with informed traders for the 
45-day window and 60–day window, respectively. For the 1993 to 2007 period industrial 
IPOs have a LSB measure of 32.37 percent and 31.88 percent for the 45- and 60 day 
window, respectively. For REIT IPOs, this is approximately 10 percent less than that 
estimated by Glascock, Hughes, and Varshney (1998) who found that REIT IPOs have 
40.24 percent for their LSB type metric. For industrial IPOs, the LSB metric is much 
closer to the 27.70 percent estimated by Glascock, Hughes, and Varshney (1998). In 
addition both the REIT IPO and industrial IPO LSB measures are lower than the LSB 
measure of 45.2 percent that Van Ness, Van Ness, and Warr (2001) estimate, but greater 
than Li, McInish, and Wongchoti (2005) estimation of 5.56 percent for the first week 
after the IPO. The comparative-means test for the LSB measure, however, are not 
significantly different which is in contrast to Glascock, Hughes, and Varshney (1998), 
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who found that the equity REIT IPOs have an adverse selection component that is 
significantly larger. 
Table 3.4 notes that samples sizes differ for each measure of asymmetric 
information because of theoretical issues. For example, RELSPREAD uses all unique 
firms in the sample; however, GH and LSB use smaller sample sizes because their 
respective adverse selection components have observations that are outside of the 
theoretical bounds of 0 to 100 percent of the quoted spread (GH) or effective spread 
(LSB). Since this is an issue, this study follows Van Ness, Van Ness, and Warr (2001), 
eliminating those firms that are either greater than 100 percent or less than 0 percent from 
the sample. The multivariate findings are robust with respect to including the eliminated 
firms in the estimation. The results with the firms included are available on request of the 
author. 
In conclusion, the univariate analysis initially indicates that specialists price in 
less asymmetric information content for REIT IPOs as compared to industrial IPOs when 
looking at the 45- and 60-day windows of relative spread and the Glosten and Harris 
(1988) metric over the 1993 to 2007 period. Thus, the evidence indicates early support of 
the alternative hypothesis found in section 3.2: REIT IPOs have fewer asymmetric 
information issues as compared to non-REIT IPOs. However, the Lin, Sanger, and Booth 
(1995) method does not indicate a difference in the asymmetric information content of 




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































CM (1990) represents Carter and Manaster (1990). CRSP represents the Center for 
Research in Security Prices. Ritter represents Jay Ritter’s website of IPO data (Ritter, 
2008). EDGAR represents the Security and Exchange Commission’s Electronic Data 
Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval system. NASD represents the National Association of 
Securities Dealers and the source for the tick change date (NASD, 1997). NYSE 




Table 3.2   Descriptive Statistics—45-Day Window 
 
Panel A: All IPO Firm Statistics Over a 45-Day Window    
Variables N  Mean Median Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
       REIT (Binary) 201 0.39 0.00 0.49 0.00 1.00 
LEVG (%) 201 38.60 36.46 28.85 0.00 174.52 
FRMSZ ($M) 201 554.20 236.50 955.49 1.00 7649.20 
ISSUESZ ($M) 201 176.68 128.25 172.29 9.20 1282.50 
UNDERPR (%) 201 7.70 3.13 13.91 -8.33 117.39 
PARTIAL (%) 201 -2.79 0.00 14.70 -48.48 71.43 
NUMIPO  201 447.89 465.00 127.65 69.00 678.00 
VCBACKED (Binary) 201 0.11 0.00 0.32 0.00 1.00 
URANK  201 8.40 9.00 1.18 2.00 9.00 
PRICE ($) 201 18.84 18.36 6.07 5.98 46.94 
VOL (100s) 201 2228.64 1472.22 2332.2 137.30 14586.90 
RISK (%) 201 38.55 35.35 10.10 22.09 77.10 
TRNOVER (%) 201 2.52 2.12 2.04 0.10 20.96 
TICKCHG (Binary) 201 0.26 0.00 0.44 0.00 1.00 
RELSPREAD (%) 201 1.22 0.99 1.00 0.22 7.26 
GH (%) 197 14.47 11.17 11.38 0.27 61.58 
LSB (%) 196 31.21 27.94 15.09 2.61 82.51 




Table 3.2   (continued) 
 
Panel B: REIT IPO Statistics Over a 45-Day Window    
Variables N  Mean Median Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
       LEVG (%)   78 41.46 41.25 19.51 0.00 92.35 
FRMSZ ($M)   78 415.26 182.10 645.66 1.00 3912.60 
ISSUESZ ($M)   78 212.10 182.81 128.32 23.40 713.95 
UNDERPR (%)   78 6.37 1.63 17.74 -5.21 117.39 
PARTIAL (%)   78 -3.93 -1.04 11.14 -48.48 26.32 
NUMIPO    78 458.15 465.00 117.99 69.00 678.00 
VCBACKED (Binary)   78 0.01 0.00 0.11 0.00 1.00 
URANK    78 8.19 9.00 1.35 2.00 9.00 
PRICE ($)   78 20.83 20.62 4.46 8.54 33.26 
VOL (100s)   78 1796.78 1361.53 1297.15 232.59 6088.76 
RISK (%)   78 36.94 34.49 8.74 22.09 67.50 
TRNOVER (%)   78 1.72 1.60 0.83 0.52 5.70 
TICKCHG (Binary)   78 0.19 0.00 0.40 0.00 1.00 
RELSPREAD (%)   78 0.95 0.90 0.65 0.22 5.49 
GH (%)   77 11.82 9.28 9.89 0.27 48.58 
LSB (%)   76 29.37 27.75 13.13 9.91 61.49 
       
Panel C: Industry IPO Statistics Over a 45-Day Window    
Variables N  Mean Median Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
       LEVG (%) 123 36.78 33.70 33.39 0.00 174.52 
FRMSZ ($M) 123 642.30 287.30 1101.54 1.40 7649.20 
ISSUESZ ($M) 123 154.22 101.15 192.25 9.20 1282.50 
UNDERPR (%) 123 8.54 4.73 10.80 -8.33 50.96 
PARTIAL (%) 123 -2.072 0.00 16.57 -37.50 71.43 
NUMIPO  123 441.38 465.00 133.48 69.00 678.00 
VCBACKED (Binary) 123 0.18 0.00 0.39 0.00 1.00 
URANK  123 8.53 9.00 1.05 2.00 9.00 
PRICE ($) 123 17.58 16.64 6.62 5.98 46.94 
VOL (100s) 123 2502.51 1593.35 2767.63 137.30 14586.90 
RISK (%) 123 39.57 35.67 10.79 23.98 77.10 
TRNOVER (%) 123 3.02 2.60 2.39 0.10 20.96 
TICKCHG (Binary) 123 0.30 0.00 0.46 0.00 1.00 
RELSPREAD (%) 123 1.40 1.13 1.14 0.23 7.26 
GH (%) 120 16.17 13.36 11.97 0.59 61.58 
LSB (%) 120 32.37 28.88 16.15 2.61 82.51 
       
The sample consists of 78 equity REIT IPOs and 123 industrial IPOs for the period 
January 1, 1993 to December 31, 2007. This table presents the summary statistics for the 
full sample. The sample of equity REIT IPOs and industrial IPOs was obtained from 
Thompson Financial’s SDC Platinum New Issues Database. We exclude mortgage REITs 
and hybrid REITs, American depositary receipts (ADRs), American depositary securities 
(ADSs), firms within the 6000’s SIC code, firms having SIC codes of 619A or 619B, 
firms within the 9000’s SIC code, unit trust securities, class B issues, beneficial interests, 
enhanced income securities, income deposit securities, limited partnership securities, 
firms not having data in the assets before offer variable, firms with an offer-price less 
than $5.00, firms with more than one issuance where the primary issue was unclear, and 
non-primary issues. Panel A presents data for all IPOs for the 45-day window after the 
IPO. Panel B presents data for REIT IPOs for the 45-day window after the IPO. Panel C 
presents data for industry IPOs for the 45-day window after the IPO. REIT is a binary 
variable equal to one if firm i is a REIT IPO, zero otherwise. LEVG represents the total 
debt to total asset ratio. FRMSZ represents the total assets prior to the offer ($ millions). 
ISSUESZ represents the proceeds of the offering ($ millions). UNDERPR represents 
underpricing or the percentage change between the offer-price and the close price on the 
first day of trade for a firm. PARTIAL represents the percentage change between the 
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offer-price and the midpoint of the original file range. NUMIPO represents the number of 
REIT and non-REIT firms that went public during the year that firm i went public. 
VCBACKED is a binary variable one, indicating that firm i was backed by a venture 
capitalist and zero otherwise. URANK is the lead underwriters reputation rank per Carter 
and Manaster (1990) for firm i, PRICE is average daily price for firm i over the time 
window. VOL is the average daily volume of shares for firm i over the time window. 
RISK is the coefficient of variation for the midpoint of the bid-ask spread or the standard 
deviation of the intraday quoted midpoint for firm i divided by the average quoted 
midpoint. TRNOVER is the proportion of average daily volume to the number of shares 
offered for firm i. TICKCHG represents a binary variable one, indicating that a Nasdaq 
firm went public after June 2, 1997 or an NYSE firm went public after June 24, 1997, 
when minimum tick size went from 1/8th to 1/16thfor each exchange and zero otherwise. 
RELSPREAD represents the proportion of the bid-ask spread to the midpoint of the quote 
[(Bid - Ask)]/[(Bid + Ask)/2]. GH represents the Glosten and Harris (1988) adverse 
selection component of firm i, such that the adverse selection cost is a percentage of the 
quoted spread. LSB represents the Lin, Sanger, Booth (1995) adverse selection 
component for firm i, such that the adverse selection cost is a percentage of the effective 
spread. IPO characteristics were obtained from SDC Platinum, Compustat, SNL REIT 
Datasource, and TAQ. Carter-Manaster reputation rankings and NUMIPO were collected 
from Jay Ritter’s IPO website (Ritter, 2008). SEC’s Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, 
and Retrieval system (EDGAR). Center for Research on Security Prices (CRSP). 
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Table 3.3   Descriptive Statistics—60-Day Window 
 
Panel A: All IPO Firm Statistics Over a 60-Day Window    
Variables N  Mean Median Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
       REIT (Binary) 201 0.39 0.00 0.49 0.00 1.00 
LEVG (%) 201 38.60 36.46 28.84 0.00 174.52 
FRMSZ ($M) 201 554.19 236.50 955.49 1.00 7649.20 
ISSUESZ ($M) 201 176.68 128.25 172.29 9.20 1282.50 
UNDERPR 201 7.70 3.13 13.91 -8.33 117.39 
PARTIAL (%) 201 -2.79 0.00 14.70 -48.48 71.43 
NUMIPO  201 447.89 465.00 127.65 69.00 678.00 
VCBACKED (Binary) 201 0.11 0.00 0.32 0.00 1.00 
URANK  201 8.40 9.00 1.18 2.00 9.00 
PRICE ($) 201 19.00 18.43 6.22 5.89 47.28 
VOL (100s) 201 1903.86 1235.82 2068.62 145.69 14586.90 
RISK (%) 201 38.54 35.00 10.37 23.01 77.10 
TRNOVER (%) 201 2.15 1.74 1.90 0.11 20.09 
TICKCHG (Binary) 201 0.26 0.00 0.44 0.00 1.00 
RELSPREAD (%) 201 1.24 0.99 1.05 0.22 7.47 
GH (%) 199 15.86 13.01 11.76 0.54 67.56 
LSB (%) 199 31.64 29.20 15.44 1.21 88.57 
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Table 3.3   (continued) 
 
Panel B: REIT IPO Statistics Over a 60-Day Window    
Variables N  Mean Median Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
       LEVG (%)   78 41.46 41.25 19.51 0.00 92.35 
FRMSZ ($M)   78 415.27 182.10 645.66 1.00 3912.60 
ISSUESZ ($M)   78 212.11 182.81 128.32 23.40 713.95 
UNDERPR   78 6.37 1.63 17.74 -5.21 117.39 
PARTIAL (%)   78 -3.93 -1.04 11.14 -48.48 26.32 
NUMIPO    78 458.15 465.00 117.99 69.00 678.00 
VCBACKED (Binary)   78 0.01 0.00 0.11 0.00 1.00 
URANK    78 8.19 9.00 1.35 2.00 9.00 
PRICE ($)   78 20.92 20.62 4.56 8.34 33.61 
VOL (100s)   78 1514.74 1138.99 1111.96 195.67 5551.49 
RISK (%)   78 37.05 34.66 8.69 23.00 65.80 
TRNOVER (%)   78 1.44 1.37 0.67 0.49 4.48 
TICKCHG   78 0.19 0.00 0.40 0.00 1.00 
RELSPREAD (%)   78 0.95 0.89 0.66 0.22 5.47 
GH (%)   78 13.32 10.87 10.03 0.54 48.58 
LSB (%)   77 31.26 29.63 14.28 1.21 61.65 
       
Panel C: Industry IPO Statistics Over a 60-Day Window    
Variables N  Mean Median Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
       LEVG (%) 123 36.79 33.70 33.39 0.00 174.52 
FRMSZ ($M) 123 642.30 287.30 1101.54 1.40 7649.20 
ISSUESZ ($M) 123 154.22 101.15 192.25 9.20 1282.50 
UNDERPR (%) 123 8.54 4.73 10.80 -8.33 50.96 
PARTIAL (%) 123 -2.07 0.00 16.57 -37.50 71.43 
NUMIPO  123 441.38 465.00 133.48 69.00 678.00 
VCBACKED (Binary) 123 0.18 0.00 0.38 0.00 1.00 
URANK  123 8.53 9.00 1.05 2.00 9.00 
PRICE ($) 123 17.78 16.78 6.82 5.89 47.28 
VOL (100s) 123 2150.62 1403.13 2465.06 145.69 14586.90 
RISK (%) 123 39.48 35.63 11.24 24.04 77.10 
TRNOVER (%) 123 2.59 2.21 2.26 0.11 20.09 
TICKCHG (Binary) 123 0.30 0.00 0.46 0.00 1.00 
RELSPREAD (%) 123 1.42 1.13 1.20 0.23 7.47 
GH (%) 121 17.51 15.91 12.52 0.79 67.56 
LSB (%) 122 31.88 29.15 16.19 2.61 88.57 
       
The sample consists of 78 equity REIT IPOs and 123 industrial IPOs for the period 
January 1, 1993 to December 31, 2007. This table presents the summary statistics for the 
full sample. The sample of equity REIT IPOs and industrial IPOs was obtained from 
Thompson Financial’s SDC Platinum New Issues Database. We exclude mortgage REITs 
and hybrid REITs, American depositary receipts (ADRs), American depositary securities 
(ADSs), firms within the 6000’s SIC code, firms having SIC codes of 619A or 619B, 
firms within the 9000’s SIC code, unit trust securities, class B issues, beneficial interests, 
enhanced income securities, income deposit securities, limited partnership securities, 
firms not having data in the assets before offer variable, firms with an offer-price less 
than $5. 00, firms with more than one issuance where the primary issue was unclear, and 
non--primary issues. Panel A presents data for all IPOs for the 60-day window after the 
IPO. Panel B presents data for REIT IPOs for the 60-day window after the IPO. Panel C 
presents data for industry IPOs for the 60-day window after the IPO. REIT is a binary 
variable equal to one if firm i is a REIT IPO, zero otherwise. LEVG represents the total 
debt to total asset ratio. FRMSZ represents the total assets prior to the offer ($ millions). 
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ISSUESZ represents the proceeds of the offering ($ millions). UNDERPR represents 
underpricing or the percentage change between the offer-price and the close price on the 
first day of trade for a firm. ISSUESZ represents the proceeds of the offering ($ millions). 
PARTIAL represents the percentage change between the offer-price and the midpoint of 
the original file range. NUMIPO represents the number of REIT and non-REIT firms that 
went public during the year that firm i went public. VCBACKED is a binary variable one, 
indicating that firm i was backed by a venture capitalist and zero otherwise. URANK is 
the lead underwriters reputation rank per Carter and Manaster (1990) for firm i, PRICE is 
average daily price for firm i over the time window. VOL is the average daily volume of 
shares for firm i over the time window. RISK is coefficient of variation for the midpoint 
of the bid-ask spread or the standard deviation of the intraday quoted midpoint for firm i 
divided by the average quoted midpoint. TRNOVER is the proportion of average daily 
volume to the number of shares offered for firm i. TICKCHG represents a binary variable 
one, indicating that a Nasdaq firm went public after June 2, 1997 or an NYSE firm went 
public after June 24, 1997, when minimum tick size went from 1/8th to 1/16thfor each 
exchange and zero otherwise. RELSPREAD represents the proportion of the bid-ask 
spread to the midpoint of the quote [(Bid - Ask)]/[(Bid + Ask)/2]. GH represents the 
Glosten and Harris (1988) adverse selection component of firm i, such that the adverse 
selection cost is a percentage of the quoted spread. LSB represents the Lin, Sanger, Booth 
(1995) adverse selection component for firm i, such that the adverse selection cost is a 
percentage of the effective spread. IPO characteristics were obtained from SDC Platinum, 
Compustat, SNL REIT Datasource, and TAQ. Carter-Manaster reputation rankings and 
NUMIPO were collected from Jay Ritter’s IPO website (Ritter, 2008). SEC’s Electronic 
Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval system (EDGAR). Center for Research on 




Table 3.4   REIT IPO and Industry IPO Asymmetric Information Content Difference in 
Means 
 
Comparing REIT IPOs Adverse Selection Cost to Industry IPOs   
Panel A: 45-Day Window       
Variables N RELSPREAD N GH N LSB 
REIT IPO means  78  0.95  77  11.82  76  29.37 
Industry IPO means  123   120 1.40   120 16.17  
Difference in means 
32.37 
  -0.45***   -4.34***   -3.00 
   (-3.54)   (-2.66)   (-1.36) 
       
Panel B: 60-Day Window       
Variables N RELSPREAD N GH N LSB 
REIT IPO means  78  0.95  78  13.32  77  31.26 
Industry IPO means  123  121 1.42   122 17.51  
Difference in means 
31.88 
  -0.47***   -4.19***   -0.62 
   (-3.58)   (-2.61)    (-0.27) 
       
The sample consists of 78 equity REIT IPOs and 123 industrial IPOs for the period 
January 1, 1993 to December 31, 2007. This table presents the comparison data between 
industrial IPOs and REIT IPOs over the 45 day and 60-day windows after the IPO. The 
sample of equity REIT IPOs and industrial IPOs was obtained from Thompson 
Financial’s SDC Platinum New Issues Database. We exclude mortgage REITs and hybrid 
REITs, American depositary receipts (ADRs), American depositary securities (ADSs), 
firms within the 6000’s SIC code, firms having SIC codes of 619A or 619B, firms within 
the 9000’s SIC code, unit trust securities, class B issues, beneficial interests, enhanced 
income securities, income deposit securities, limited partnership securities, firms not 
having data in the assets before offer variable, firms with an offer-price less than $5.00, 
firms with more than one issuance where the primary issue was unclear, and non-primary 
issues. Panel A presents the means and difference in means for the adverse selection cost 
components over the 45-day window. Panel B presents the means and difference in 
means for the adverse selection cost components over the 60-day window. RELSPREAD 
represents the proportion of the bid-ask spread to the midpoint of the quote [(Bid - 
Ask)]/[(Bid + Ask)/2]. GH represents the Glosten and Harris (1988) adverse selection 
component of firm i, such that the adverse selection cost is a percentage of the quoted 
spread. LSB represents the Lin, Sanger, Booth (1995) adverse selection component for 
firm i, such that the adverse selection cost is a percentage of the effective spread. IPO 
characteristics were obtained from SDC Platinum, Compustat, SNL REIT Datasource, 
and TAQ. Carter-Manaster reputation rankings and NUMIPO were collected from Jay 
Ritter’s IPO website (Ritter, 2008). SEC’s Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and 
Retrieval system (EDGAR). Center for Research on Security Prices (CRSP). The t-
statistics are in parentheses. The Statistical significance is displayed by the use of one 












4.1 Model (1) – Analysis of Asymmetric Information 
 
 Considering the univariate analysis in Chapter III, that provides early support for 
the alternative hypothesis, asymmetric information is less or greater for REIT IPOs than 
industrial IPOs, this study now focuses on the development of multivariate models to test 
the alternative hypothesis in more depth. Glascock, Hughes, and Varshney (1998) 
provide a framework from which to start and establish a proxy for asymmetric 
information in the REIT IPO environment. They use the relative bid-ask spread as the 
measure for liquidity, and since it indirectly implies a level of asymmetric information, 
this seems to be a logical choice as the initial proxy. 
While Glascock, Hughes, and Varshney (1998) analyze the univariate statistics of 
the adverse selection component estimated using a model similar to Lin, Sanger, and 
Booth (1995), they do not use it in their regression models, as it appears they are more 
interested in bid-ask spreads as a measure of liquidity. However, liquidity and 
asymmetric information are inversely related in that greater (less) asymmetry is indicated 
by less (greater) liquidity. In addition, Van Ness, Van Ness, and Warr (2001) argue that 
because of the high correlation of the spread with adverse selection estimates from 
commonly used models, these various estimates may be noisy measures of spread. Thus, 
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while the relative bid-ask spread is not an adverse selection cost measure per se, it 
provides an initial comparative measure nonetheless.  
 To extend Glascock, Hughes, and Varshney (1998) this study uses the adverse 
selection component estimations as the proxy for the level of the asymmetric information 
level by isolating the portion of the spread that is considered to cover the specialist’s cost 
of dealing with informed traders. The methods of estimation for the adverse selection 
components are estimated using Glosten and Harris (1988) and Lin, Sanger, Booth 
(1995). Van Ness, Van Ness, and Warr (2001) find that these estimation methods perform 
comparatively well in explaining the variation of variables associated with asymmetric 
information. 
 The control variables of uncertainty can be broadly categorized, like Jenkinson 
and Ljungqvist (2001), into the categories of company characteristics, offering 
characteristics, certification, aftermarket, and informed investors.  
 The first independent variable, and the most important for this study, is the 
company characteristic binary variable taking a value of one if the firm is a REIT, zero 
otherwise. The sign and significance of the variable indicates whether the level of the 
asymmetric information in relative bid-ask spreads of REIT IPOs is less than or greater 
than that of industrial IPOs. Glascock, Hughes, and Varshney (1998) find that, for their 
sample of firms in the 1985 to 1988 time frame, common stock IPOs have significantly 
smaller relative bid-ask spreads than do REIT IPOs. Support for the proposed hypothesis 
will be indicated by a significantly negative coefficient, but a positive coefficient will 
confirm Glascock, Hughes, and Varshney (1998). 
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The next independent variable is price, and it is categorized as an aftermarket 
variable. Glascock, Hughes, and Varshney (1998); Demsetz (1968); Tinic (1972), 
Bentson and Hagerman (1974); Hamilton (1976); and McInish and Wood (1992) find that 
price is positively related to the bid-ask spread and negatively related to the relative 
spread, since the change in spread and price is not proportional. Demsetz (1968) 
describes the positive relation as the result of limit-order traders arbitraging away any 
excess spread-per-dollar, so that the cost-per-dollar exchanged will be proportional as the 
price increases. However, if brokerage costs reflect the underlying cost per dollar 
transacted, and it differs as the price changes, then the proportionality that is caused by 
arbitrage is reduced. The less-than-proportional change results in a negative relation, 
which has been well-documented between the price and the relative bid-ask spread. 
 The third common determinate is another aftermarket variable—share volume. 
Benston and Hagerman (1974) argue that dealer inventory, held to execute transactions 
immediately, competes with limit orders and can be considered a substitute. When 
volume is high, and more limit orders are likely, there is less required inventory per 
transaction. Thus, volume will be inversely related to the bid-ask spread and has been 
well documented by Demsetz (1968); Tinic (1972); Bentson and Hagerman (1974); 
Hamilton (1976); McInish and Wood (1992); and Glascock, Hughes, and Varshney 
(1998). 
 The fourth independent variable is also an aftermarket variable that measures 
inventory risk. Bentson and Hagerman (1974) argue that the relation between the spread 
and return variance, a measure of inventory holding risk, is positive since dealers adverse 
to risk must be compensated for being unable to diversify their inventory holdings. This 
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relation has been documented by Bentson and Hagerman (1974); McInish and Wood 
(1992); and Glascock, Hughes, and Varshney (1998). Li, McInish, and Wongchoti (2005) 
use the volatility in the price quotes to proxy for inventory risk and find the expected 
positive relation noted above. This study follows the methodology of Li, McInish, and 
Wongchoti (2005). 
The final independent variable is a binary variable to account for any impact that 
the change in tick size from 1/8ths to 1/16ths of a $1.00 in the year 1997 for Nasdaq and 
the NYSE. The Nasdaq instituted the change on June 2, 1997 (Chung, Van Ness, and Van 
Ness, 2002; and NASD, 1997). The NYSE established the change on June 24, 1997 
(Chung, Van Ness, and Van Ness, 2002; and McSweeny, 1997).  
Model (1) is as follows: 
iiiDiDiDi TICKCHGLNRISKLNVOLLNPRICEREITADV εββββββ ++++++= 5 ,4 ,3 ,210i D, M, , (4) 
 
Where M of ADVM,D,i represents one of the following three dependent variables: 
RELSPREAD, the average relative bid-ask spread [ ] ( )[ ]( )2AskBidAskBid +− , GH of the 
Glosten and Harris (1988) adverse selection component, and LSB of the Lin, Sanger, 
Booth (1995) adverse selection component for firm i, D of ADVM,D,i indicates that the 
variable is for the 45- or 60-day window after the IPO. REITi is a binary variable set 
equal to one if firm i is a REIT IPO, zero otherwise. LNPRICED,i is the natural logarithm 
of the average daily price for firm i. The next variable, LNVOLD,i, is the natural logarithm 
of the average daily transaction volume for firm i. LNRISKD,i is the natural log of the 
coefficient of variation for the midpoint of the bid-ask spread. TICKCHG is a binary 
variable set to one for a Nasdaq firm IPO after June 2, 1997 or an NYSE firm IPO after 
June 24, 1997, zero otherwise. 
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4.2. Model (2) – Analysis of Asymmetric Information 
 
 While Model (1) extends the Glascock, Hughes, and Varshney (1998) model by 
considering both the relative spread and the adverse selection models of Glosten and 
Harris (1988) and Lin, Sanger, and Booth (1995), Model (1) does not consider other 
control variables that could be related to asymmetric information, initial public offerings, 
or those that others have found to be significantly related to adverse selection 
components. 
 Van Ness, Van Ness, and Warr (2001) find a positive and significant relation 
between asymmetric information component and leverage, a company characteristic, 
using the Glosten and Harris (1988) model. They argue that this finding is caused by 
fixed charges associated with debt, which increase as more leverage is taken on, thereby 
increasing the volatility of cash flows, and in this manner increasing the volatility of the 
valuation of the firm. 
 Li, McInish, and Wongchoti (2005) document that firm size, a company 
characteristic, is significantly and negatively related to the amount of asymmetric 
information. Lakonishok and Lee (2001) find that insiders, such as high-level managers, 
are better positioned to exploit private information when they are involved with small 
firms as opposed to large firms, since they have little opportunity to exploit their private 
information as these firms seem to be efficiently priced. Thus, one would expect a 
negative relation between the size of the firm and the measure of the level of asymmetric 
information. 
  Carter, Dark, and Singh (1998) argue that offering size, an offering characteristic, 
should control for risk in the issue in that initial returns should be reduced since a larger 
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issue is more often made by more established firms. They find that offer size is 
significantly and negatively related to initial returns. Li, McInish, and Wongchoti (2005) 
also find a similar relation in that the adverse selection component is significant and 
negatively related to the size of the issue.  
 Li, McInish, and Wongchoti (2005) find that for the first forty-eight weeks after 
issuance, the initial return, an offering characteristic, was significantly and negatively 
related to the adverse selection component. This finding supports the hypothesis that the 
more the IPO is underpriced, the greater the incentive will be for information production 
in the IPO aftermarket. This finding seems counter-intuitive when one considers that 
Ljungqvist (2005) states that many empirical studies support the positive relation 
between asymmetric information and underpricing. 
 Benveniste, Ljungqvist, Wilhelm, and Yu (2003) argue that a greater number of 
previous IPO issues within a similar industry, an offering characteristic, reduce 
underpricing because of the spillover effect of information. The spillover effect of 
information comes about because of the successful marketing effort of a firm in a 
particular industry. As other firms realize they too may be well-received in the market 
place, firms surge to go public and an IPO wave for firms with similar valuation factors is 
begun. 
 Benveniste, Ljungqvist, Wilhelm, and Yu (2003) find that the relation between 
the number of IPOs in a similar industry that take place 180 days prior to a firms IPO is 
significantly and negatively related to underpricing. Li, McInish, and Wongchoti (2005) 
also find a significant negative relation between underpricing and the number of previous 
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IPOs, as well as a significant negative relationship between the asymmetric information 
component and the number of previous IPOs over the first 48 weeks of trading. 
 Megginson and Weiss (1991) argue that venture capitalists play a certification 
role by reducing the amount of asymmetric information between the issuing firm and 
investors leading to a reduction in the amount of underpricing. They find that the relation 
between underpricing and the involvement of venture capitalists is negative and 
significant.  
 Carter and Manaster (1990) hypothesize that more prestigious underwriters take 
firms that have lower variation in underpricing public; thus certifying which issues are 
better. They find that the relation between an underwriter-prestige ranking and the 
standard deviation of underpricing from the offer to the two-week close price is 
significant and negative. In addition, Ling and Ryngaert (1997) find that REIT IPO 
underpricing is negatively related to underwriters with high reputation rankings. Thus, 
firms with less asymmetry of information about their value are brought to market by 
underwriters who are more prestigious. 
 Easley, Kiefer, O’Hara, and Paperman (1996) argue that information-based 
trading should be more of a problem in firms without much trading activity. They find 
that the probability of information-based trade is significantly greater for infrequently 
traded firms. Li, McInish and Wongchoti (2005) have a similar finding in that turnover, 
an aftermarket variable, is negatively related to the adverse selection component. Thus, 
firms that are frequently traded should have less asymmetric information. 
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 As in the previous models, the key variable of interest is that of the REIT binary 
variable, as it tests the hypothesis. The control variables above are included with those 
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, (5) 
Again, M of ADVM,D,i represents one of the following three dependent variables: 
RELSPREAD, the average relative bid-ask spread [ ] ( )[ ]( )2AskBidAskBid +− , GH of the 
Glosten and Harris (1988) adverse selection component, and LSB of the Lin, Sanger, 
Booth (1995) adverse selection component for firm i. D indicates that the variable is for 
the 45- or 60-day window after the IPO. LEVGi is the debt ratio of the firm. LNFRMSZi is 
the natural logarithm of the total assets before the offering. LNISSUESZi is the natural 
logarithm of the proceeds. Then, UNDERPRi is the offer to close return on the initial day. 
Next, LNNUMIPOi is the natural logarithm of the number of REIT IPOs going public in 
the same year of the IPO firm i to proxy for spillover effect of IPO activity. VCBACKEDi 
is a binary variable one, indicating that firm i was backed by a venture capitalist, zero 
otherwise. Then, URANKi is the lead underwriters reputation rank per Carter and 
Manaster (1990) for firm i. Next, LNTRNOVERD,i is the natural logarithm of the ratio of 
the average daily volume to the number of shares offered for firm i. 
 
4.3. Model (3) – Analysis of Asymmetric Information 
 
 While the initial return or underpricing variable was used in Model (2), as in Li, 
Wongchoti, and McInish (2005), it is conceivable that the underpricing may be the result 
of asymmetric information since they are both estimated in the aftermarket. Thus, 
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endogeneity may exist. Li, McInish, and Wongchoti (2005) control for this problem by 
using a two stage least squares model to estimate the initial return and then use the initial 
return estimates as the control variables in their asymmetric models.  
  Another way to address the endogeneity issue would be to use the partial 
adjustment variable as an instrumental variable for underpricing. Benveniste and Spindt 
(1989) argue that underpricing is used to induce primary investors to share their true 
demand for an issue by partially adjusting the offer-price, while at the same time, 
providing a larger allocation of shares to more than offset the adjustment. Several 
empiricists have found this to be the case. Hanley (1993); Bradley, Gonas, Highfield, and 
Roskelley (2008); and Highfield, Roskelley, and Steele (2009) find that the partial 
adjustment of the offer-price to the original file range is significantly and positively 
related to underpricing and the offer-price to open-price return.  
 Thus, Model (3) contains the same variables as Model (2) with the exception that 
the variable PARTIALi, which represents the percentage change between the offer-price 
and the midpoint of the original file range for firm i, replaces the underpricing control 
variable. The variable of interest in this model is again the REIT binary variable, as it 
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5.1. Multivariate Results Introduction 
 This chapter reports the results for the multivariate models developed in Chapter 
IV and tests the alternative hypothesis in Chapter III. As previously noted, the alternative 
hypothesis is that equity REIT IPOs have smaller or larger relative spreads or adverse 
selection component costs than that of industrial IPOs. The univariate results reported in 
Chapter III indicated early support for the alternative hypothesis in that REIT IPOs had 
less asymmetric information; however, multivariate analysis results are presented in this 
chapter. 
 
5.2. Multivariate Results for Model (1) – Analysis of Asymmetric Information 
 This study not only uses Glascock, Hughes, and Varshney (1998) as a 
foundational frame work but also extends their work by using a similar model to test the 
data for the 1993 to 2007 period. Table 5.1 contains the results for Model (1) where M of 
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 (4) 
Panel A contains the results for all firms for which the relative spread, [(Bid - Ask)]/[(Bid 
+ Ask)/2], is measured over a 45-day window for each of the three matches of similar 
assets size, underwriter ranking, and partial adjustment. The key variable of interest for 
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the alternative hypothesis is the REIT binary variable with one indicating the firm is a 
REIT IPO, zero otherwise. As shown, the asset match model is the sole regression in 
which REIT is negative and significant. 
 Panel B contains the results for firms where the relative spread is calculated over 
a 60-day window and contains the three different models for the asset match, underwriter 
ranking match, and partial adjustment match. Again, REIT is negative and significant for 
only the asset match model. 
 In the analysis of the data, a number of the observations have dependent variables 
that are clearly outside of three standard deviations from the mean for all 201 
observations. Thus, Model (1) is estimated again after eliminating these firms from the 
sample. Table 5.2 presents the results. 
 First, Panel A presents the results for variables calculated over a 45-day window 
for the three matches of assets, underwriter ranking, and partial adjustment. The REIT 
variable is negative and highly significant for all three of the matches. Panel B presents 
the results for the three models with variables estimated over a 60-day window after the 
initial offering. The REIT variable is again negative and significant for all matches. 
 The conclusion that can be drawn, from the results of Model (1) for the full 
sample found in Table 5.1, is that the asset match supports the alternative hypothesis and 
contradicts Glascock, Hughes, and Varshney (1998), who find that REIT IPOs have 
greater asymmetric information content than common stock IPOs. In addition, the 
truncated results in Table 5.2 indicate that across all matches and both time windows 
REIT IPOs have less asymmetric information issues than non-REIT IPOs. 
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 To extend the Glascock, Hughes, and Varshney (1998) model, the study next 
considers the results for Model (1) where M of ADVM,D,i is GH, the Glosten and Harris 
(1988) adverse selection component, and LSB, the Lin, Sanger, and Booth (1995) adverse 
selection component. The samples used are restricted to GH and LSB observations that 
are within the theoretical bounds of 0 to 100 percent as per Van Ness, Van Ness, and 
Warr (2001). 
 Table 5.3 contains the results for the model using GH as the dependent variable. 
Panel A and Panel B contain the results for the 45-day window and 60-day window, 
respectively. The results indicate that the REIT variable is negative and statistically 
significant for firms matched by similar assets, underwriter ranking, and partial 
adjustment for both time frames. Additionally, the REIT coefficients are larger for the 
GH model than that found in the RELSPREAD model. 
 Next, the results for the truncated sample are presented in Table 5.4. The sample 
is truncated by removing dependent observations that are three standard deviations from 
the mean for all 201 firms. In Panel A the asset matched firms for the 45-day window are 
the results of interests as it is the only model in the panel that have GH observations that 
are outliers. The results are in line with those found in Table 5.3 in that the REIT variable 
is negative and significant. Again, the results in Panel B show that the REIT coefficient is 
negative and significant for the asset and partial adjustment matches, the models that 
contain outliers. The size of the coefficients for both Panel A and B are similar to the 
corresponding models found in Table 5.3. 
 Having looked at the GH variable, the study focuses next on the LSB variable for 
equation (4). Table 5.5 describes the results with Panel A containing those for the 45-day 
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window. The REIT variable is again negative and significant for firms with similar assets, 
underwriters, and partial adjustments. Panel B presents the 60-day window results, and 
again, REIT IPOs have significantly less asymmetric information as estimated by the LSB 
adverse selection component. In addition, the coefficients tend to be larger for the LSB 
model than that found in the GH model. 
 Table 5.6 presents the results for the truncated sample where LSB observations 
that are three standard deviations from the mean for all 201 firms are eliminated. Panel A 
shows that for the 45-day window the REIT variable is negative and statistically 
significant for firms matched by asset, underwriter reputation, and partial adjustment. 
Panel B describes the results for the 60-day window, and again, REIT IPOs have 
significantly less asymmetric information across all three matches. 
 In conclusion, it appears that the results for Model (1), when considered as a 
whole, reject the null hypothesis and indicate strong support for the alternative hypothesis 
that REIT IPOs have less asymmetric information than industrial IPOs. While these 
results build on the work of Glascock, Hughes, and Varshney (1998) the findings stand in 
opposition to theirs in that REIT IPOs have less asymmetric information content, not 
more. 
 
5.3. Multivariate Results for Model (2) – Analysis of Asymmetric Information 
 Having tested the model framework, and extended the Glascock, Hughes, and 
Varshney (1998) model to a new time period, this study now considers the results for 
Model (2), which includes the additional control variables associated with asymmetric 
information and the IPO environment. Model (2) was first estimated using equation (5), 
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and the results indicated that multicollinarity existed between LNVOLD,i and 
LNPRICED,i..Thus, equation (5) was modified so that Model (2) is estimated using 
equation (5A), which retains the variable LNPRICED,i, and equation (5B), which retains 





















             
             






















             
             
             
 (5B) 
The results presented in Table 5.7 are for estimates where M of ADVM,D,i is 
RELSPREAD. Panel A and Panel B describe the results for the 45-day and 60-day 
windows after the IPO, respectively. In contrast to the earlier results, the REIT variable is 
not significantly different from zero for the asset match, underwriter ranking match, and 
the partial adjustment match. In Table 5.8 observations that are three standard deviations 
from the mean are removed. Panel A for the 45-day window indicates that the REIT 
variable is negative and significant for equations (5A) and (5B) when firms are matched 
by underwriter ranking and the partial adjustment. Panel B describes similar results for 
the 60-day time frame with REIT IPOs having significantly less asymmetric information 
when matched by similar quality underwriters and similar partial adjustments to the final 
offer-price. 
 Next, Table 5.9 provides the results for equations (5A) and (5B) where the 
dependent variable is the Glosten and Harris (1988) metric GH. The results reflect that 
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the GH observations outside of the theatrical bounds of 0 to 100 percent have been 
removed following Van Ness, Van Ness, and Warr (2001). Panels A and B describe the 
results for the 45- and 60-day windows, respectively. The REIT binary variable is 
negative and statistically significant for both time frames. Table 5.10 contains the 
truncated results for the 45-day window in Panel A and the 60-day window in Panel B. 
The results in both panels again indicate that REIT IPOs have significantly less 
asymmetric information for the three matches. 
 The study then uses LSB as the dependent variable in equations (5A) and (5B). 
Again, only firms with LSB observations within the theoretical bounds of 0 to 100 
percent of the effective spread are retained following Van Ness, Van Ness, and Warr 
(2001). The results are presented in Panel A and Panel B of Table 5.11, and as before, 
they contain the results based on metrics estimated over the 45-day period and 60-day 
period after the IPO, respectively. As shown in both panels, REIT initial issues again 
have less asymmetric information than matched industrial IPOs based on assets, similar 
quality underwriters, and similar final adjustments to the offer-price.  
 Lastly, Table 5.12 contains the results for the samples where LSB observations 
beyond three standard deviations from the mean for all 201 firms are eliminated. Panel A 
shows the results for the 45-day window where once more the REIT variable coefficients 
are negative and significant for all three matches. Panel B illustrates that REIT IPOs 
matched by underwriter quality and partial adjustments have significantly less 
asymmetric information. 
 In summary, with the exception of the full sample results for RELSPREAD in 
Table 5.7, the truncated asset match RELSPREAD results in Table 5.8, and the truncated 
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asset match LSB results in Panel B of Table 5.12, REIT IPOs consistently appear to 
contain less asymmetric information content than that of industrial IPOs as measured by 
the three asymmetric information proxies controlling for the IPO and asymmetric 
information environments. These results conflict with those found by Glascock, Hughes, 
and Varshney (1998) and indicate that, as measured by the relative spread or adverse 
selection components over the first 45- and 60-day windows, REIT IPOs have less 
asymmetric information content than industrial IPOs. 
 
5.4. Multivariate Results for Model (3) – Analysis of Asymmetric Information 
 This study concludes by testing Model (3) found in equation (6). This model is 
designed to use partial adjustment, the percentage change in the final offer-price to the 
midpoint of the original file range, instead of the underpricing variable since both 
underpricing and the asymmetric information variables are estimated in the aftermarket. 
Since the partial adjustment is made in the pre-market and has been found to be 
significantly and positively related to underpricing by Hanley (1993); Bradley, Gonas, 
Highfield, and Roskelley (2008); and Highfield, Roskelley, and Steele (2008), it is used 
in order to offset any potential endogenity issues with the underpricing variable in 
equation (5). As shown in Tables 5.13 through 5.18, the results are robust.  
 
5.5. Conclusion of Results 
 From the market makers perspective the results presented here indicate that the 
level of asymmetric information in equity REIT IPOs as proxied for by the relative 
spread or the adverse selection cost components of Glosten and Harris (1988) and Lin, 
Sanger, and Booth (1995) is less than that of industrial IPOs. In addition, it appears that, 
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of the three proxies the relative spread is the weakest in explaining the adverse selection 
cost differences between REIT IPOs and industrial IPOs. 
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Table 5.1   Multivariate Analysis–Relative Spread in Model (1): All Observations 
 




Rank  Partial Adjustment 
Variable RELSPREAD  RELSPREAD  RELSPREAD Estimate P-Value  Estimate P-Value  Estimate P-Value 
         INTERCEPT  11.322***  (0.000)   12.495***  (0.000)   12.340***  (0.000) 
REIT  -0.213*  (0.053)   -0.121  (0.266)   -0.126  (0.194) 
LNPRICE   -1.059***  (0.002)   -1.506***  (0.000)   -1.324***  (0.000) 
LNVOL   -0.098  (0.233)   -0.191***  (0.003)   -0.152***  (0.006) 
LNRISK   -1.752***  (0.008)   -1.544***  (0.003)   -1.731***  (0.001) 
TICKCHG  0.174  (0.373)   0.267  (0.225)   0.183  (0.335) 
         
         Observations  140   122   144 
R2  0.498   0.589   0.541 
Adjusted R2  0.479   0.571   0.525 
F-Statistic  16.99***   12.79***   17.55*** 
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Table 5.1   (continued) 
 




Rank  Partial Adjustment 
Variable 
RELSPREAD  RELSPREAD  RELSPREAD 
Estimate P-Value  Estimate P-Value  Estimate P-Value 
         INTERCEPT  11.619***  (0.000)   13.448***  (0.000)   13.482***  (0.000) 
REIT  -0.201*  (0.069)   -0.109  (0.332)   -0.129  (0.185) 
LNPRICE   -1.088***  (0.002)   -1.604***  (0.000)   -1.371***  (0.000) 
LNVOL   -0.096  (0.223)   -0.156**  (0.022)   -0.146***  (0.009) 
LNRISK   -1.824***  (0.004)   -1.809***  (0.000)   -2.033***  (0.000) 
TICKCHG  0.213  (0.283)   0.352  (0.124)   0.335*  (0.094) 
         
         Observations  140   122   144 
R2  0.500   0.615   0.558 
Adjusted R2  0.481   0.598   0.542 
F-Statistic  14.97***   13.16***   15.46*** 
      The sample consists of 78 equity REIT IPOs and 123 industrial IPOs for the period 
January 1, 1993 to December 31, 2007. This table provides the OLS regression results for 
the dependent variables RELSPREAD for equation (4). The sample of equity REIT IPOs 
and industrial IPOs was obtained from Thompson Financial’s SDC Platinum New Issues 
Database. The following are excluded from the sample: mortgage REITs and hybrid 
REITs, American depositary receipts (ADRs), American depositary securities (ADSs), 
firms within the 6000’s SIC code, firms having SIC codes of 619A or 619B, firms within 
the 9000’s SIC code, unit trust securities, class B issues, beneficial interests, enhanced 
income securities, income deposit securities, limited partnership securities, firms not 
having data in the assets before offer variable, firms with an offer-price less than $5.00, 
firms with more than one issuance where the primary issue was unclear, and non-primary 
issues. Panel A presents the OLS regression results for firms matched by assets, 
underwriter reputation, and partial adjustment, where the RELSPREAD metric is 
measured over a 45-day window after the IPO. Panel B presents the OLS regression 
results for firms matched by assets, underwriter reputation, and partial adjustment, where 
the RELSPREAD metric is measured over a 60-day window after the IPO. REIT is a 
binary variable equal to one if firm i is a REIT IPO, zero otherwise. LNPRICE is the 
natural log of the average daily price for firm i over the time window. LNVOL is the 
natural log of the average daily volume of shares for firm i over the time window. 
LNRISK is the natural log of the coefficient of variation for the midpoint of the bid-ask 
spread or the standard deviation of the intraday quoted midpoint for firm i divided by the 
average quoted midpoint. TICHCHG is a binary variable equal to one if firm i was issued 
on the NASDAQ on or after June 2, 1997 or on the NYSE on or after June 24, 1997, zero 
otherwise. RELSPREAD represents the proportion of the bid-ask spread to the midpoint 
of the quote [(Bid - Ask)]/[(Bid + Ask)/2] and is a proxy for adverse selection costs. IPO 
characteristics were obtained from SDC Platinum, Compustat, SNL REIT Datasource, 
and TAQ. Statistical significance is emphasized using bold font. The Breusch-Pagan test 
was used to analyze the samples for heteroscedasticity. Regressions use White’s 
Heteroscedastic Corrected Errors. The Statistical significance is displayed by the use of 
one (10%), two (5 %) and three (1%) stars. 
 
73 
Table 5.2   Multivariate Analysis–Relative Spread in Model (1): Truncated Sample 
 




Rank  Partial Adjustment 
Variable RELSPREAD  RELSPREAD  RELSPREAD Estimate P-Value  Estimate P-Value  Estimate P-Value 
         INTERCEPT  7.041***  (0.000)   7.210***  (0.000)   6.606***  (0.000) 
REIT  -0.255***  (0.000)   -0.251***  (0.000)   -0.244***  (0.000) 
LNPRICE   -0.595***  (0.000)   -0.713***  (0.000)   -0.559***  (0.000) 
LNVOL   -0.160***  (0.000)   -0.178***  (0.000)   -0.145***  (0.000) 
LNRISK   -0.811***  (0.002)   -0.749**  (0.018)   -0.770***  (0.001) 
TICKCHG  -0.063  (0.564)   0.130  (0.529)   -0.023  (0.864) 
         
         Observations  138   116   138 
R2  0.600   0.657   0.671 
Adjusted R2  0.585   0.641   0.659 
F-Statistic  33.16***   40.05***   62.50*** 
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Table 5.2   (continued) 
 




Rank  Partial Adjustment 
Variable 
RELSPREAD  RELSPREAD  RELSPREAD 
Estimate P-Value  Estimate P-Value  Estimate P-Value 
         INTERCEPT  7.449***  (0.000)   7.752***  (0.000)   7.438***  (0.000) 
REIT  -0.250***  (0.000)   -0.250***  (0.000)   -0.241***  (0.000) 
LNPRICE   -0.619***  (0.000)   -0.745***  (0.001)   -0.607***  (0.000) 
LNVOL   -0.152***  (0.000)   -0.172***  (0.000)   -0.135***  (0.000) 
LNRISK   -0.930***  (0.000)   -0.893***  (0.008)   -0.990***  (0.000) 
TICKCHG  -0.014  (0.904)   0.195  (0.378)   0.083  (0.581) 
         
         Observations  138   116   138 
R2  0.605   0.654   0.671 
Adjusted R2  0.590   0.638   0.658 
F-Statistic  31.78***   39.61***   72.07*** 
      The sample consists of 78 equity REIT IPOs and 123 industrial IPOs for the period 
January 1, 1993 to December 31, 2007. This table provides the OLS regression results for 
the dependent variables RELSPREAD for equation (4) where RELSPREAD observations 
that lie more than three standard deviations from the mean of all 201 firms are removed. 
The sample of equity REIT IPOs and industrial IPOs was obtained from Thompson 
Financial’s SDC Platinum New Issues Database. The following are excluded from the 
sample: mortgage REITs and hybrid REITs, American depositary receipts (ADRs), 
American depositary securities (ADSs), firms within the 6000’s SIC code, firms having 
SIC codes of 619A or 619B, firms within the 9000’s SIC code, unit trust securities, class 
B issues, beneficial interests, enhanced income securities, income deposit securities, 
limited partnership securities, firms not having data in the assets before offer variable, 
firms with an offer-price less than $5.00, firms with more than one issuance where the 
primary issue was unclear, and non-primary issues. Panel A presents the OLS regression 
results for firms matched by assets, underwriter reputation, and partial adjustment, where 
the RELSPREAD metric is measured over a 45-day window after the IPO. Panel B 
presents the OLS regression results for firms matched by assets, underwriter reputation, 
and partial adjustment, where the RELSPREAD metric is measured over a 60-day 
window after the IPO. REIT is a binary variable equal to one if firm i is a REIT IPO, zero 
otherwise. LNPRICE is the natural log of the average daily price for firm i over the time 
window. LNVOL is the natural log of the average daily volume of shares for firm i over 
the time window. LNRISK is the natural log of the coefficient of variation for the 
midpoint of the bid-ask spread or the standard deviation of the intraday quoted midpoint 
for firm i divided by the average quoted midpoint. TICHCHG is a binary variable equal 
to one if firm i was issued on the NASDAQ on or after June 2, 1997 or on the NYSE on 
or after June 24, 1997, zero otherwise. RELSPREAD represents the proportion of the bid-
ask spread to the midpoint of the quote [(Bid - Ask)]/[(Bid + Ask)/2] and is a proxy for 





IPO characteristics were obtained from SDC Platinum, Compustat, SNL REIT 
Datasource, and TAQ. Statistical significance is emphasized using bold font. The 
Breusch-Pagan test was used to analyze the samples for heteroscedasticity.Regressions 
use White’s Heteroscedastic Corrected Errors. The Statistical significance is displayed by 
the use of one (10%), two (5 %) and three (1%) stars. 
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Table 5.3   Multivariate Analysis–Glosten and Harris (1988) Adverse Selection 
Component in Model (1): All Observations 
 




Rank  Partial Adjustment 
Variable GH  GH  GH Estimate P-Value  Estimate P-Value  Estimate P-Value 
         INTERCEPT  -65.980***  (0.002)   -54.959**  (0.025)   -55.634***   (0.005) 
REIT  -4.829**  (0.012)   -5.313***  (0.003)   -5.614***  (0.001) 
LNPRICE   6.615*  (0.067)   6.430**  (0.037)   8.781***  (0.003) 
LNVOL   -5.901***  (0.000)   -4.502***  (0.000)   -7.436***  (0.000) 
LNRISK   29.236***  (0.000)   23.293***  (0.002)   27.641***  (0.000) 
TICKCHG  4.010  (0.257)   5.235  (0.177)   7.306**  (0.022) 
         
         Observations  136   121   141 
R2  0.415   0.416   0.441 
Adjusted R2  0.393   0.391   0.420 
F-Statistic  18.87***   11.48***   20.38*** 
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Table 5.3   (continued) 
 




Rank  Partial Adjustment 
Variable 
GH  GH  GH 
Estimate P-Value  Estimate P-Value  Estimate P-Value 
         INTERCEPT  -60.514***  (0.005)   -58.031**  (0.016)   -62.315***  (0.002) 
REIT  -5.476***  (0.004)   -6.161***  (0.001)   -6.368***  (0.000) 
LNPRICE   7.962**  (0.022)   8.531***  (0.005)   10.297***  (0.000) 
LNVOL   -6.994***  (0.000)   -5.785***  (0.000)   -8.641***  (0.000) 
LNRISK   28.993***  (0.000)   25.390***  (0.001)   30.879***  (0.000) 
TICKCHG  4.356   (0.224)   4.859  (0.216)   6.625**  (0.040) 
         
         Observations  138   122   143 
R2  0.403   0.408   0.458 
Adjusted R2  0.380   0.383   0.438 
F-Statistic  19.55***   11.64***   22.40*** 
      
The sample consists of 78 equity REIT IPOs and 123 industrial IPOs for the period 
January 1, 1993 to December 31, 2007. This table provides the OLS regression results for 
the dependent variables GH for equation (4). The sample of equity REIT IPOs and 
industrial IPOs was obtained from Thompson Financial’s SDC Platinum New Issues 
Database. The following are excluded from the sample: mortgage REITs and hybrid 
REITs, American depositary receipts (ADRs), American depositary securities (ADSs), 
firms within the 6000’s SIC code, firms having SIC codes of 619A or 619B, firms within 
the 9000’s SIC code, unit trust securities, class B issues, beneficial interests, enhanced 
income securities, income deposit securities, limited partnership securities, firms not 
having data in the assets before offer variable, firms with an offer-price less than $5.00, 
firms with more than one issuance where the primary issue was unclear, and non-primary 
issues. Panel A presents the OLS regression results for firms matched by assets, 
underwriter reputation, and partial adjustment, where the GH metric is measured over a 
45-day window after the IPO. Panel B presents the OLS regression results for firms 
matched by assets, underwriter reputation, and partial adjustment, where the GH metric is 
measured over a 60-day window after the IPO. REIT is a binary variable equal to one if 
firm i is a REIT IPO, zero otherwise. LNPRICE is the natural log of the average daily 
price for firm i over the time window. LNVOL is the natural log of the average daily 
volume of shares for firm i over the time window. LNRISK is the natural log of the 
coefficient of variation for the midpoint of the bid-ask spread or the standard deviation of 
the intraday quoted midpoint for firm i divided by the average quoted midpoint. 
TICHCHG is a binary variable equal to one if firm i was issued on the NASDAQ on or 
after June 2, 1997 or on the NYSE on or after June 24, 1997, zero otherwise. GH 
represents the Glosten and Harris (1988) adverse selection component of firm i, such that 
the adverse selection cost is a percentage of the quoted spread. IPO characteristics were 
obtained from SDC Platinum, Compustat, SNL REIT Datasource, and TAQ. Statistical 
significance is emphasized using bold font. The Breusch-Pagan test was used to analyze 
the samples for heteroscedasticity. Regressions use White’s Heteroscedastic Corrected 
Errors. The Statistical significance is displayed by the use of one (10%), two (5 %) and 
three (1%) stars. 
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Table 5.4   Multivariate Analysis–Glosten and Harris (1988) Adverse Selection 
Component in Model (1): Truncated Sample 
 




Rank  Partial Adjustment 
Variable GH  GH  GH Estimate P-Value  Estimate P-Value  Estimate P-Value 
         INTERCEPT  -65.784***  (0.002)   -54.959**  (0.025)   -55.634***   (0.005) 
REIT  -4.876**  (0.011)   -5.313***  (0.003)   -5.614***  (0.001) 
LNPRICE   6.636*  (0.066)   6.430**  (0.037)   8.781***  (0.003) 
LNVOL   -5.907***  (0.000)   -4.502***  (0.000)   -7.436***  (0.000) 
LNRISK   29.175***  (0.000)   23.293***  (0.002)   27.641***  (0.000) 
TICKCHG  4.068  (0.251)   5.235  (0.177)   7.306**  (0.022) 
         
         Observations  135   121   141 
R2  0.416   0.416   0.441 
Adjusted R2  0.393   0.391   0.420 
F-Statistic  18.88***   11.48***   20.38*** 
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Table 5.4   (continued) 
 




Rank  Partial Adjustment 
Variable GH  GH  GH Estimate P-Value  Estimate P-Value  Estimate P-Value 
         INTERCEPT  -60.403***  (0.005)   -58.031**  (0.016)   -59.062***  (0.002) 
REIT  -5.504***  (0.004)   -6.161***  (0.001)   -5.652***  (0.000) 
LNPRICE   7.970**  (0.021)   8.531***  (0.005)   9.404***  (0.000) 
LNVOL   -6.996***  (0.000)   -5.785***  (0.000)   -7.701***  (0.000) 
LNRISK   28.958***  (0.000)   25.390***  (0.001)   28.624***  (0.000) 
TICKCHG  4.388  (0.222)   4.859  (0.216)   6.993**  (0.032) 
         
         Observations  137   122   141 
R2  0.403   0.408   0.453 
Adjusted R2  0.380   0.383   0.433 
F-Statistic  19.55***   11.64***   27.20*** 
      
The sample consists of 78 equity REIT IPOs and 123 industrial IPOs for the period 
January 1, 1993 to December 31, 2007. This table presents the OLS regression results for 
the dependent variables GH for equation (4) where GH observations that lie more than 
three standard deviations from the mean of all 201 firms are removed. The sample of 
equity REIT IPOs and industrial IPOs was obtained from Thompson Financial’s SDC 
Platinum New Issues Database. The following are excluded from the sample: mortgage 
REITs and hybrid REITs, American depositary receipts (ADRs), American depositary 
securities (ADSs), firms within the 6000’s SIC code, firms having SIC codes of 619A or 
619B, firms within the 9000’s SIC code, unit trust securities, class B issues, beneficial 
interests, enhanced income securities, income deposit securities, limited partnership 
securities, firms not having data in the assets before offer variable, firms with an offer-
price less than $5.00, firms with more than one issuance where the primary issue was 
unclear, and non-primary issues. Panel A presents the OLS regression results for firms 
matched by assets, underwriter reputation, and partial adjustment, where the GH metric is 
measured over a 45-day window after the IPO. Panel B presents the OLS regression 
results for firms matched by assets, underwriter reputation, and partial adjustment, where 
the GH metric is measured over a 60-day window after the IPO. REIT is a binary variable 
equal to one if firm i is a REIT IPO, zero otherwise. LNPRICE is the natural log of the 
average daily price for firm i over the time window. LNVOL is the natural log of the 
average daily volume of shares for firm i over the time window. LNRISK is the natural 
log of the coefficient of variation for the midpoint of the bid-ask spread or the standard 
deviation of the intraday quoted midpoint for firm i divided by the average quoted 
midpoint. TICHCHG is a binary variable equal to one if firm i was issued on the 
NASDAQ on or after June 2, 1997 or on the NYSE on or after June 24, 1997, zero 
otherwise. GH represents the Glosten and Harris (1988) adverse selection component of 
firm i, such that the adverse selection cost is a percentage of the quoted spread. IPO 
characteristics were obtained from SDC Platinum, Compustat, SNL REIT Datasource, 
and TAQ. Statistical significance is emphasized using bold font. The Breusch-Pagan test 
was used to analyze the samples for heteroscedasticity. Regressions use White’s 
Heteroscedastic Corrected Errors. The Statistical significance is displayed by the use of 
one (10%), two (5 %) and three (1%) stars. 
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Table 5.5   Multivariate Analysis–Lin, Sanger, and Booth (1995) Adverse Section 
Component in Model (1): All Observations 
 




Rank  Partial Adjustment 
Variable LSB  LSB  LSB Estimate P-Value  Estimate P-Value  Estimate P-Value 
         INTERCEPT  23.132  (0.437)   8.082  (0.761)   -16.945  (0.535) 
REIT  -10.154***  (0.001)   -8.472***  (0.002)   -9.121***  (0.001) 
LNPRICE   16.412***  (0.000)   16.186***  (0.000)   20.056***  (0.000) 
LNVOL   -5.771***  (0.003)   -5.300***  (0.002)   -6.824***  (0.000) 
LNRISK   2.637  (0.771)   5.239  (0.550)   12.655  (0.151) 
TICKCHG  -2.720  (0.519)   -0.986  (0.823)   -5.201  (0.178) 
         
         Observations  137   121   140 
R2  0.165   0.177   0.222 
Adjusted R2  0.133   0.141   0.193 
F-Statistic  5.72***   5.80***   9.01*** 
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Table 5.5   (continued) 
     




Rank  Partial Adjustment 
Variable 
LSB  LSB  LSB 
Estimate P-Value  Estimate P-Value  Estimate P-Value 
         INTERCEPT  27.397  (0.357)   23.787  (0.437)   7.631  (0.802) 
REIT  -7.431***  (0.010)   -7.932***  (0.006)   -6.281**  (0.014) 
LNPRICE   16.176***  (0.000)   15.968***  (0.000)   17.875***  (0.000) 
LNVOL   -4.604**  (0.041)   -3.858**  (0.050)   -4.804**  (0.014) 
LNRISK   -1.043  (0.912)   -1.828  (0.855)   2.856  (0.765) 
TICKCHG  -3.413  (0.456)   -0.213  (0.967)   -3.388  (0.431) 
         
         Observations  138   122   143 
R2  0.138   0.137   0.155 
Adjusted R2  0.106   0.100   0.124 
F-Statistic  4.99***   4.05***   5.33*** 
      
The sample consists of 78 equity REIT IPOs and 123 industrial IPOs for the period 
January 1, 1993 to December 31, 2007. This table provides the OLS regression results for 
the dependent variables LSB for equation (4). The sample of equity REIT IPOs and 
industrial IPOs was obtained from Thompson Financial’s SDC Platinum New Issues 
Database. The following are excluded from the sample: mortgage REITs and hybrid 
REITs, American depositary receipts (ADRs), American depositary securities (ADSs), 
firms within the 6000’s SIC code, firms having SIC codes of 619A or 619B, firms within 
the 9000’s SIC code, unit trust securities, class B issues, beneficial interests, enhanced 
income securities, income deposit securities, limited partnership securities, firms not 
having data in the assets before offer variable, firms with an offer-price less than $5.00, 
firms with more than one issuance where the primary issue was unclear, and non-primary 
issues. Panel A presents the OLS regression results for firms matched by assets, 
underwriter reputation, and partial adjustment, where the LSB metric is measured over a 
45-day window after the IPO. Panel B presents the OLS regression results for firms 
matched by assets, underwriter reputation, and partial adjustment, where the LSB metric 
is measured over a 60-day window after the IPO. REIT is a binary variable equal to one if 
firm i is a REIT IPO, zero otherwise. LNPRICE is the natural log of the average daily 
price for firm i over the time window. LNVOL is the natural log of the average daily 
volume of shares for firm i over the time window. LNRISK is the natural log of the 
coefficient of variation for the midpoint of the bid-ask spread or the standard deviation of 
the intraday quoted midpoint for firm i divided by the average quoted midpoint. 
TICHCHG is a binary variable equal to one if firm i was issued on the NASDAQ on or 
after June 2, 1997 or on the NYSE on or after June 24, 1997, zero otherwise. LSB 
represents the Lin, Sanger, Booth (1995) adverse selection component for firm i, such 
that the adverse selection cost is a percentage of the effective spread. IPO characteristics 
were obtained from SDC Platinum, Compustat, SNL REIT Datasource, and TAQ. 
Statistical significance is emphasized using bold font. The Breusch-Pagan test was used 
to analyze the samples for heteroscedasticity. Regressions use White’s Heteroscedastic 
Corrected Errors. The Statistical significance is displayed by the use of one (10%), two (5 
%) and three (1%) stars. 
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Table 5.6   Multivariate Analysis–Lin, Sanger, and Booth (1995) Adverse Section 
Component in Model (1): Truncated Sample 
 




Rank  Partial Adjustment 
Variable LSB  LSB  LSB Estimate P-Value  Estimate P-Value  Estimate P-Value 
         INTERCEPT  0.036  (0.999)   -4.833  (0.836)   -24.947  (0.262) 
REIT  -7.200***  (0.006)   -6.347***  (0.009)   -6.810***  (0.002) 
LNPRICE   13.324***  (0.001)   14.789***  (0.000)   16.776***  (0.000) 
LNVOL   -5.920***  (0.002)   -4.997***  (0.004)   -6.638***  (0.000) 
LNRISK   11.293  (0.140)   8.916  (0.272)   16.554**  (0.023) 
TICKCHG  -5.018  (0.208)   -2.117  (0.623)   -5.679*  (0.094) 
         
         Observations  132   117   135 
R2  0.147   0.175   0.214 
Adjusted R2  0.113   0.137   0.183 
F-Statistic  5.15***   5.70***   7.96*** 




Table 5.6   (continued) 
 




Rank  Partial Adjustment 
Variable 
LSB  LSB  LSB 
Estimate P-Value  Estimate P-Value  Estimate P-Value 
         INTERCEPT  14.834  (0.595)   17.472  (0.515)   12.535  (0.676) 
REIT  -5.251**  (0.045)   -4.984**  (0.042)   -4.629**  (0.048) 
LNPRICE   14.652***  (0.001)   14.688***  (0.000)   17.183***  (0.000) 
LNVOL   -3.771*  (0.070)   -2.235  (0.163)   -3.282*  (0.066) 
LNRISK   1.449  (0.868)   -2.988  (0.722)   -1.437  (0.876) 
TICKCHG  -3.711  (0.406)   -0.031  (0.995)   -2.324  (0.586) 
         
         Observations  133   116   139 
R2  0.121   0.129   0.150 
Adjusted R2  0.087   0.089   0.118 
F-Statistic  4.05***   3.77***   4.78*** 
      
The sample consists of 78 equity REIT IPOs and 123 industrial IPOs for the period 
January 1, 1993 to December 31, 2007. This table provides the OLS regression results for 
the dependent variables LSB for equation (4) where LSB observations that lie more than 
three standard deviations from the mean of all 201 firms are removed. The sample of 
equity REIT IPOs and industrial IPOs was obtained from Thompson Financial’s SDC 
Platinum New Issues Database. The following are excluded from the sample: mortgage 
REITs and hybrid REITs, American depositary receipts (ADRs), American depositary 
securities (ADSs), firms within the 6000’s SIC code, firms having SIC codes of 619A or 
619B, firms within the 9000’s SIC code, unit trust securities, class B issues, beneficial 
interests, enhanced income securities, income deposit securities, limited partnership 
securities, firms not having data in the assets before offer variable, firms with an offer-
price less than $5.00, firms with more than one issuance where the primary issue was 
unclear, and non-primary issues. Panel A presents the OLS regression results for firms 
matched by assets, underwriter reputation, and partial adjustment, where the LSB metric 
is measured over a 45-day window after the IPO. Panel B presents the OLS regression 
results for firms matched by assets, underwriter reputation, and partial adjustment, where 
the LSB metric is measured over a 60-day window after the IPO. REIT is a binary 
variable equal to one if firm i is a REIT IPO, zero otherwise. LNPRICE is the natural log 
of the average daily price for firm i over the time window. LNVOL is the natural log of 
the average daily volume of shares for firm i over the time window. LNRISK is the 
natural log of the coefficient of variation for the midpoint of the bid-ask spread or the 
standard deviation of the intraday quoted midpoint for firm i divided by the average 
quoted midpoint. TICHCHG is a binary variable equal to one if firm i was issued on the 
NASDAQ on or after June 2, 1997 or on the NYSE on or after June 24, 1997, zero 
otherwise. LSB represents the Lin, Sanger, Booth (1995) adverse selection component for 






IPO characteristics were obtained from SDC Platinum, Compustat, SNL REIT 
Datasource, and TAQ. Statistical significance is emphasized using bold font. The 
Breusch-Pagan test was used to analyze the samples for heteroscedasticity. Regressions 
use White’s Heteroscedastic Corrected Errors. The Statistical significance is displayed by 











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Panel A presents the OLS regression results for firms matched by assets, underwriter 
reputation, and partial adjustment, where the RELSPREAD metric is measured over a 45-
day window after the IPO. Panel B presents the OLS regression results for firms matched 
by assets, underwriter reputation, and partial adjustment, where the RELSPREAD metric 
is measured over a 60-day window after the IPO. REIT is a binary variable equal to one if 
firm i is a REIT IPO, zero otherwise. LEVG represents the total debt to total asset ratio. 
LNFRMSZ represents the natural log of total assets prior to the offer ($ millions). 
LNISSUESZ represents the natural log of proceeds of the offering ($ millions). 
UNDERPR represents underpricing or the percentage change between the offer-price and 
the close price on the first day of trade for a firm. LNNUMIPO represents the natural log 
of number of REIT and non-REIT firms that went public during the year that firm i went 
public. VCBACKED is a binary variable one, indicating that firm i was backed by a 
venture capitalist and zero otherwise.URANK is the lead underwriters reputation rank per 
Carter and Manaster (1990) for firm i. LNPRICE is the natural log of the average daily 
price for firm i over the time window. LNVOL is the natural log of the average daily 
volume of shares for firm i over the time window. LNRISK is the natural log of the 
coefficient of variation for the midpoint of the bid-ask spread or the standard deviation of 
the intraday quoted midpoint for firm i divided by the average quoted midpoint. 
LNTRNOVER is the natural log of the proportion of average daily volume to the average 
number of shares offered for firm i. TICHCHG is a binary variable equal to one if firm i 
was issued on the NASDAQ on or after June 2, 1997 or on the NYSE on or after June 24, 
1997, zero otherwise. RELSPREAD represents the proportion of the bid-ask spread to the 
midpoint of the quote [(Bid - Ask)]/[(Bid + Ask)/2] and is a proxy for adverse selection 
costs. IPO characteristics were obtained from SDC Platinum, Compustat, SNL REIT 
Datasource, and TAQ. Carter-Manaster reputation rankings were collected from Jay 
Ritter’s IPO website (Ritter, 2008). Statistical significance is emphasized using bold font. 
The Breusch-Pagan test was used to analyze the samples for heteroscedasticity. 
Regressions use White’s Heteroscedastic Corrected Errors. The Statistical significance is 











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Panel A presents the OLS regression results for firms matched by assets, underwriter 
reputation, and partial adjustment, where the RELSPREAD metric is measured over a 45-
day window after the IPO. Panel B presents the OLS regression results for firms matched 
by assets, underwriter reputation, and partial adjustment, where the RELSPREAD metric 
is measured over a 60-day window after the IPO. REIT is a binary variable equal to one if 
firm i is a REIT IPO, zero otherwise. LEVG represents the total debt to total asset ratio. 
LNFRMSZ represents the natural log of total assets prior to the offer ($ millions). 
LNISSUESZ represents the natural log of proceeds of the offering ($ millions). 
UNDERPR represents underpricing or the percentage change between the offer-price and 
the close price on the first day of trade for a firm. LNNUMIPO represents the natural log 
of number of REIT and non-REIT firms that went public during the year that firm i went 
public. VCBACKED is a binary variable one, indicating that firm i was backed by a 
venture capitalist and zero otherwise. URANK is the lead underwriters reputation rank per 
Carter and Manaster (1990) for firm i. LNPRICE is the natural log of the average daily 
price for firm i over the time window. LNVOL is the natural log of the average daily 
volume of shares for firm i over the time window. LNRISK is the natural log of the 
coefficient of variation for the midpoint of the bid-ask spread or the standard deviation of 
the intraday quoted midpoint for firm i divided by the average quoted midpoint. 
LNTRNOVER is the natural log of the proportion of average daily volume to the average 
number of shares offered for firm i. TICHCHG is a binary variable equal to one if firm i 
was issued on the NASDAQ on or after June 2, 1997 or on the NYSE on or after June 24, 
1997, zero otherwise. RELSPREAD represents the proportion of the bid-ask spread to the 
midpoint of the quote [(Bid - Ask)]/[(Bid + Ask)/2] and is a proxy for adverse selection 
costs. IPO characteristics were obtained from SDC Platinum, Compustat, SNL REIT 
Datasource, and TAQ. Carter-Manaster reputation rankings were collected from Jay 
Ritter’s IPO website (Ritter, 2008). Statistical significance is emphasized using bold font. 
Regressions use White’s Heteroscedastic Corrected Errors. The Statistical significance is 













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Panel A presents the OLS regression results for firms matched by assets, underwriter 
reputation, and partial adjustment, where the GH metric is measured over a 45-day 
window after the IPO. Panel B presents the OLS regression results for firms matched by 
assets, underwriter reputation, and partial adjustment, where the GH metric is measured 
over a 60-day window after the IPO. REIT is a binary variable equal to one if firm i is a 
REIT IPO, zero otherwise. LEVG represents the total debt to total asset ratio. LNFRMSZ 
represents the natural log of total assets prior to the offer ($ millions). LNISSUESZ 
represents the natural log of proceeds of the offering ($ millions). UNDERPR represents 
underpricing or the percentage change between the offer-price and the close price on the 
first day of trade for a firm. LNNUMIPO represents the natural log of number of REIT 
and non-REIT firms that went public during the year that firm i went public. VCBACKED 
is a binary variable one, indicating that firm i was backed by a venture capitalist and zero 
otherwise. URANK is the lead underwriters reputation rank per Carter and Manaster 
(1990) for firm i. LNPRICE is the natural log of the average daily price for firm i over the 
time window. LNVOL is the natural log of the average daily volume of shares for firm i 
over the time window. LNRISK is the natural log of the coefficient of variation for the 
midpoint of the bid-ask spread or the standard deviation of the intraday quoted midpoint 
for firm i divided by the average quoted midpoint. LNTRNOVER is the natural log of the 
proportion of average daily volume to the average number of shares offered for firm i. 
TICHCHG is a binary variable equal to one if firm i was issued on the NASDAQ on or 
after June 2, 1997 or on the NYSE on or after June 24, 1997, zero otherwise. GH 
represents the Glosten and Harris (1988) adverse selection component of firm i, such that 
the adverse selection cost is a percentage of the quoted spread. IPO characteristics were 
obtained from SDC Platinum, Compustat, SNL REIT Datasource, and TAQ. Carter-
Manaster reputation rankings were collected from Jay Ritter’s IPO website (Ritter, 2008). 
Statistical significance is emphasized using bold font. Regressions use White’s 
Heteroscedastic Corrected Errors. The Statistical significance is displayed by the use of 


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Panel A presents the OLS regression results for firms matched by assets, underwriter 
reputation, and partial adjustment, where the GH metric is measured over a 45-day 
window after the IPO. Panel B presents the OLS regression results for firms matched by 
assets, underwriter reputation, and partial adjustment, where the GH metric is measured 
over a 60-day window after the IPO. REIT is a binary variable equal to one if firm i is a 
REIT IPO, zero otherwise. LEVG represents the total debt to total asset ratio. LNFRMSZ 
represents the natural log of total assets prior to the offer ($ millions). LNISSUESZ 
represents the natural log of proceeds of the offering ($ millions). UNDERPR represents 
underpricing or the percentage change between the offer-price and the close price on the 
first day of trade for a firm. LNNUMIPO represents the natural log of number of REIT 
and non-REIT firms that went public during the year that firm i went public. VCBACKED 
is a binary variable one, indicating that firm i was backed by a venture capitalist and zero 
otherwise. URANK is the lead underwriters reputation rank per Carter and Manaster 
(1990) for firm i. LNPRICE is the natural log of the average daily price for firm i over the 
time window. LNVOL is the natural log of the average daily volume of shares for firm i 
over the time window. LNRISK is the natural log of the coefficient of variation for the 
midpoint of the bid-ask spread or the standard deviation of the intraday quoted midpoint 
for firm i divided by the average quoted midpoint. LNTRNOVER is the natural log of the 
proportion of average daily volume to the average number of shares offered for firm i. 
TICHCHG is a binary variable equal to one if firm i was issued on the NASDAQ on or 
after June 2, 1997 or on the NYSE on or after June 24, 1997, zero otherwise. GH 
represents the Glosten and Harris (1988) adverse selection component of firm i, such that 
the adverse selection cost is a percentage of the quoted spread. IPO characteristics were 
obtained from SDC Platinum, Compustat, SNL REIT Datasource, and TAQ. Carter-
Manaster reputation rankings were collected from Jay Ritter’s IPO website (Ritter, 2008). 
Statistical significance is emphasized using bold font. Regressions use White’s 
Heteroscedastic Corrected Errors. The Statistical significance is displayed by the use of 































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Panel A presents the OLS regression results for firms matched by assets, underwriter 
reputation, and partial adjustment, where the LSB metric is measured over a 45-day 
window after the IPO. Panel B presents the OLS regression results for firms matched by 
assets, underwriter reputation, and partial adjustment, where the LSB metric is measured 
over a 60-day window after the IPO. REIT is a binary variable equal to one if firm i is a 
REIT IPO, zero otherwise. LEVG represents the total debt to total asset ratio. LNFRMSZ 
represents the natural log of total assets prior to the offer ($ millions). LNISSUESZ 
represents the natural log of proceeds of the offering ($ millions). UNDERPR represents 
underpricing or the percentage change between the offer-price and the close price on the 
first day of trade for a firm. LNNUMIPO represents the natural log of number of REIT 
and non-REIT firms that went public during the year that firm i went public. VCBACKED 
is a binary variable one, indicating that firm i was backed by a venture capitalist and zero 
otherwise. URANK is the lead underwriters reputation rank per Carter and Manaster 
(1990) for firm i. LNPRICE is the natural log of the average daily price for firm i over the 
time window. LNVOL is the natural log of the average daily volume of shares for firm i 
over the time window. LNRISK is the natural log of the coefficient of variation for the 
midpoint of the bid-ask spread or the standard deviation of the intraday quoted midpoint 
for firm i divided by the average quoted midpoint. LNTRNOVER is the natural log of the 
proportion of average daily volume to the average number of shares offered for firm i. 
TICHCHG is a binary variable equal to one if firm i was issued on the NASDAQ on or 
after June 2, 1997 or on the NYSE on or after June 24, 1997, zero otherwise. LSB 
represents the Lin, Sanger, Booth (1995) adverse selection component for firm i, such 
that the adverse selection cost is a percentage of the effective spread. IPO characteristics 
were obtained from SDC Platinum, Compustat, SNL REIT Datasource, and TAQ. Carter-
Manaster reputation rankings were collected from Jay Ritter’s IPO website (Ritter, 2008). 
Statistical significance is emphasized using bold font. Regressions use White’s 
Heteroscedastic Corrected Errors. The Statistical significance is displayed by the use of 



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Panel A presents the OLS regression results for firms matched by assets, underwriter 
reputation, and partial adjustment, where the LSB metric is measured over a 45-day 
window after the IPO. Panel B presents the OLS regression results for firms matched by 
assets, underwriter reputation, and partial adjustment, where the LSB metric is measured 
over a 60-day window after the IPO. REIT is a binary variable equal to one if firm i is a 
REIT IPO, zero otherwise. LEVG represents the total debt to total asset ratio. LNFRMSZ 
represents the natural log of total assets prior to the offer ($ millions). LNISSUESZ 
represents the natural log of proceeds of the offering ($ millions). UNDERPR represents 
underpricing or the percentage change between the offer-price and the close price on the 
first day of trade for a firm. LNNUMIPO represents the natural log of number of REIT 
and non-REIT firms that went public during the year that firm i went public. VCBACKED 
is a binary variable one, indicating that firm i was backed by a venture capitalist and zero 
otherwise. URANK is the lead underwriters reputation rank per Carter and Manaster 
(1990) for firm i. LNPRICE is the natural log of the average daily price for firm i over the 
time window. LNVOL is the natural log of the average daily volume of shares for firm i 
over the time window. LNRISK is the natural log of the coefficient of variation for the 
midpoint of the bid-ask spread or the standard deviation of the intraday quoted midpoint 
for firm i divided by the average quoted midpoint. LNTRNOVER is the natural log of the 
proportion of average daily volume to the average number of shares offered for firm i. 
TICHCHG is a binary variable equal to one if firm i was issued on the NASDAQ on or 
after June 2, 1997 or on the NYSE on or after June 24, 1997, zero otherwise. LSB 
represents the Lin, Sanger, Booth (1995) adverse selection component for firm i, such 
that the adverse selection cost is a percentage of the effective spread. IPO characteristics 
were obtained from SDC Platinum, Compustat, SNL REIT Datasource, and TAQ. Carter-
Manaster reputation rankings were collected from Jay Ritter’s IPO website (Ritter, 2008). 
Statistical significance is emphasized using bold font. Regressions use White’s 
Heteroscedastic Corrected Errors. The Statistical significance is displayed by the use of 

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Panel A presents the OLS regression results for firms matched by assets, underwriter 
reputation, and partial adjustment, where the RELSPREAD metric is measured over a 45-
day window after the IPO. Panel B presents the OLS regression results for firms matched 
by assets, underwriter reputation, and partial adjustment, where the RELSPREAD metric 
is measured over a 60-day window after the IPO. REIT is a binary variable equal to one if 
firm i is a REIT IPO, zero otherwise. LEVG represents the total debt to total asset ratio. 
LNFRMSZ represents the natural log of total assets prior to the offer ($ millions). 
LNISSUESZ represents the natural log of proceeds of the offering ($ millions). PARTIAL 
represents the percentage change between the offer-price and the midpoint of the original 
file range. LNNUMIPO represents the natural log of number of REIT and non-REIT 
firms that went public during the year that firm i went public. VCBACKED is a binary 
variable one, indicating that firm i was backed by a venture capitalist and zero otherwise. 
URANK is the lead underwriters reputation rank per Carter and Manaster (1990) for firm 
i. LNPRICE is the natural log of the average daily price for firm i over the time window. 
LNVOL is the natural log of the average daily volume of shares for firm i over the time 
window. LNRISK is the natural log of the coefficient of variation for the midpoint of the 
bid-ask spread or the standard deviation of the intraday quoted midpoint for firm i 
divided by the average quoted midpoint. LNTRNOVER is the natural log of the proportion 
of average daily volume to the average number of shares offered for firm i. TICHCHG is 
a binary variable equal to one if firm i was issued on the NASDAQ on or after June 2, 
1997 or on the NYSE on or after June 24, 1997, zero otherwise. RELSPREAD represents 
the proportion of the bid-ask spread to the midpoint of the quote [(Bid - Ask)]/[(Bid + 
Ask)/2] and is a proxy for adverse selection costs. IPO characteristics were obtained from 
SDC Platinum, Compustat, SNL REIT Datasource, and TAQ. Carter-Manaster reputation 
rankings were collected from Jay Ritter’s IPO website (Ritter, 2008). Statistical 
significance is emphasized using bold font. Regressions use White’s Heteroscedastic 
Corrected Errors. The Statistical significance is displayed by the use of one (10%), two (5 






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Panel A presents the OLS regression results for firms matched by assets, underwriter 
reputation, and partial adjustment, where the RELSPREAD metric is measured over a 45-
day window after the IPO. Panel B presents the OLS regression results for firms matched 
by assets, underwriter reputation, and partial adjustment, where the RELSPREAD metric 
is measured over a 60-day window after the IPO. REIT is a binary variable equal to one if 
firm i is a REIT IPO, zero otherwise. LEVG represents the total debt to total asset ratio. 
LNFRMSZ represents the natural log of total assets prior to the offer ($ millions). 
LNISSUESZ represents the natural log of proceeds of the offering ($ millions). 
UNDERPR represents underpricing or the percentage change between the offer-price and 
the close price on the first day of trade for a firm. LNNUMIPO represents the natural log 
of number of REIT and non-REIT firms that went public during the year that firm i went 
public. VCBACKED is a binary variable one, indicating that firm i was backed by a 
venture capitalist and zero otherwise. URANK is the lead underwriters reputation rank per 
Carter and Manaster (1990) for firm i. LNPRICE is the natural log of the average daily 
price for firm i over the time window. LNVOL is the natural log of the average daily 
volume of shares for firm i over the time window. LNRISK is the natural log of the 
coefficient of variation for the midpoint of the bid-ask spread or the standard deviation of 
the intraday quoted midpoint for firm i divided by the average quoted midpoint. 
LNTRNOVER is the natural log of the proportion of average daily volume to the average 
number of shares offered for firm i. TICHCHG is a binary variable equal to one if firm i 
was issued on the NASDAQ on or after June 2, 1997 or on the NYSE on or after June 24, 
1997, zero otherwise. RELSPREAD represents the proportion of the bid-ask spread to the 
midpoint of the quote [(Bid - Ask)]/[(Bid + Ask)/2] and is a proxy for adverse selection 
costs. IPO characteristics were obtained from SDC Platinum, Compustat, SNL REIT 
Datasource, and TAQ. Carter-Manaster reputation rankings were collected from Jay 
Ritter’s IPO website (Ritter, 2008). Statistical significance is emphasized using bold font. 
Regressions use White’s Heteroscedastic Corrected Errors. The Statistical significance is 












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Panel A presents the OLS regression results for firms matched by assets, underwriter 
reputation, and partial adjustment, where the GH metric is measured over a 45-day 
window after the IPO. Panel B presents the OLS regression results for firms matched by 
assets, underwriter reputation, and partial adjustment, where the GH metric is measured 
over a 60-day window after the IPO. REIT is a binary variable equal to one if firm i is a 
REIT IPO, zero otherwise. LEVG represents the total debt to total asset ratio. LNFRMSZ 
represents the natural log of total assets prior to the offer ($ millions). LNISSUESZ 
represents the natural log of proceeds of the offering ($ millions). PARTIAL represents 
the percentage change between the offer-price and the midpoint of the original file range. 
LNNUMIPO represents the natural log of number of REIT and non-REIT firms that went 
public during the year that firm i went public. VCBACKED is a binary variable one, 
indicating that firm i was backed by a venture capitalist and zero otherwise. URANK is 
the lead underwriters reputation rank per Carter and Manaster (1990) for firm i. 
LNPRICE is the natural log of the average daily price for firm i over the time window. 
LNVOL is the natural log of the average daily volume of shares for firm i over the time 
window. LNRISK is the natural log of the coefficient of variation for the midpoint of the 
bid-ask spread or the standard deviation of the intraday quoted midpoint for firm i 
divided by the average quoted midpoint. LNTRNOVER is the natural log of the proportion 
of average daily volume to the average number of shares offered for firm i. TICHCHG is 
a binary variable equal to one if firm i was issued on the NASDAQ on or after June 2, 
1997 or on the NYSE on or after June 24, 1997, zero otherwise. GH represents the 
Glosten and Harris (1988) adverse selection component of firm i, such that the adverse 
selection cost is a percentage of the quoted spread. IPO characteristics were obtained 
from SDC Platinum, Compustat, SNL REIT Datasource, and TAQ. Carter-Manaster 
reputation rankings were collected from Jay Ritter’s IPO website (Ritter, 2008). 
Statistical significance is emphasized using bold font. Regressions use White’s 
Heteroscedastic Corrected Errors. The Statistical significance is displayed by the use of 









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Panel A presents the OLS regression results for firms matched by assets, underwriter 
reputation, and partial adjustment, where the GH metric is measured over a 45-day 
window after the IPO. Panel B presents the OLS regression results for firms matched by 
assets, underwriter reputation, and partial adjustment, where the GH metric is measured 
over a 60-day window after the IPO. REIT is a binary variable equal to one if firm i is a 
REIT IPO, zero otherwise. LEVG represents the total debt to total asset ratio. LNFRMSZ 
represents the natural log of total assets prior to the offer ($ millions). LNISSUESZ 
represents the natural log of proceeds of the offering ($ millions). PARTIAL represents 
the percentage change between the offer-price and the midpoint of the original file range. 
LNNUMIPO represents the natural log of number of REIT and non-REIT firms that went 
public during the year that firm i went public. VCBACKED is a binary variable one, 
indicating that firm i was backed by a venture capitalist and zero otherwise. URANK is 
the lead underwriters reputation rank per Carter and Manaster (1990) for firm i. 
LNPRICE is the natural log of the average daily price for firm i over the time window. 
LNVOL is the natural log of the average daily volume of shares for firm i over the time 
window. LNRISK is the natural log of the coefficient of variation for the midpoint of the 
bid-ask spread or the standard deviation of the intraday quoted midpoint for firm i 
divided by the average quoted midpoint. LNTRNOVER is the natural log of the proportion 
of average daily volume to the average number of shares offered for firm i. TICHCHG is 
a binary variable equal to one if firm i was issued on the NASDAQ on or after June 2, 
1997 or on the NYSE on or after June 24, 1997, zero otherwise. GH represents the 
Glosten and Harris (1988) adverse selection component of firm i, such that the adverse 
selection cost is a percentage of the quoted spread. IPO characteristics were obtained 
from SDC Platinum, Compustat, SNL REIT Datasource, and TAQ. Carter-Manaster 
reputation rankings were collected from Jay Ritter’s IPO website (Ritter, 2008). 
Statistical significance is emphasized using bold font. Regressions use White’s 
Heteroscedastic Corrected Errors. The Statistical significance is displayed by the use of 






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Panel A presents the OLS regression results for firms matched by assets, underwriter 
reputation, and partial adjustment, where the LSB metric is measured over a 45-day 
window after the IPO. Panel B presents the OLS regression results for firms matched by 
assets, underwriter reputation, and partial adjustment, where the LSB metric is measured 
over a 60-day window after the IPO. REIT is a binary variable equal to one if firm i is a 
REIT IPO, zero otherwise. LEVG represents the total debt to total asset ratio. LNFRMSZ 
represents the natural log of total assets prior to the offer ($ millions). LNISSUESZ 
represents the natural log of proceeds of the offering ($ millions). PARTIAL represents 
the percentage change between the offer-price and the midpoint of the original file range. 
LNNUMIPO represents the natural log of number of REIT and non-REIT firms that went 
public during the year that firm i went public. VCBACKED is a binary variable one, 
indicating that firm i was backed by a venture capitalist and zero otherwise. URANK is 
the lead underwriters reputation rank per Carter and Manaster (1990) for firm i. 
LNPRICE is the natural log of the average daily price for firm i over the time window. 
LNVOL is the natural log of the average daily volume of shares for firm i over the time 
window. LNRISK is the natural log of the coefficient of variation for the midpoint of the 
bid-ask spread or the standard deviation of the intraday quoted midpoint for firm i 
divided by the average quoted midpoint. LNTRNOVER is the natural log of the proportion 
of average daily volume to the average number of shares offered for firm i. TICHCHG is 
a binary variable equal to one if firm i was issued on the NASDAQ on or after June 2, 
1997 or on the NYSE on or after June 24, 1997, zero otherwise. LSB represents the Lin, 
Sanger, Booth (1995) adverse selection component for firm i, such that the adverse 
selection cost is a percentage of the effective spread. IPO characteristics were obtained 
from SDC Platinum, Compustat, SNL REIT Datasource, and TAQ. Carter-Manaster 
reputation rankings were collected from Jay Ritter’s IPO website (Ritter, 2008). 
Statistical significance is emphasized using bold font. Regressions use White’s 
Heteroscedastic Corrected Errors. The Statistical significance is displayed by the use of 





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Panel A presents the OLS regression results for firms matched by assets, underwriter 
reputation, and partial adjustment, where the LSB metric is measured over a 45-day 
window after the IPO. Panel B presents the OLS regression results for firms matched by 
assets, underwriter reputation, and partial adjustment, where the LSB metric is measured 
over a 60-day window after the IPO. REIT is a binary variable equal to one if firm i is a 
REIT IPO, zero otherwise. LEVG represents the total debt to total asset ratio. LNFRMSZ 
represents the natural log of total assets prior to the offer ($ millions). LNISSUESZ 
represents the natural log of proceeds of the offering ($ millions). PARTIAL represents 
the percentage change between the offer-price and the midpoint of the original file range. 
LNNUMIPO represents the natural log of number of REIT and non-REIT firms that went 
public during the year that firm i went public. VCBACKED is a binary variable one, 
indicating that firm i was backed by a venture capitalist and zero otherwise. URANK is 
the lead underwriters reputation rank per Carter and Manaster (1990) for firm i. 
LNPRICE is the natural log of the average daily price for firm i over the time window. 
LNVOL is the natural log of the average daily volume of shares for firm i over the time 
window. LNRISK is the natural log of the coefficient of variation for the midpoint of the 
bid-ask spread or the standard deviation of the intraday quoted midpoint for firm i 
divided by the average quoted midpoint. LNTRNOVER is the natural log of the proportion 
of average daily volume to the average number of shares offered for firm i. TICHCHG is 
a binary variable equal to one if firm i was issued on the NASDAQ on or after June 2, 
1997 or on the NYSE on or after June 24, 1997, zero otherwise. LSB represents the Lin, 
Sanger, Booth (1995) adverse selection component for firm i, such that the adverse 
selection cost is a percentage of the effective spread. IPO characteristics were obtained 
from SDC Platinum, Compustat, SNL REIT Datasource, and TAQ. Carter-Manaster 
reputation rankings were collected from Jay Ritter’s IPO website (Ritter, 2008). 
Statistical significance is emphasized using bold font. Regressions use White’s 
Heteroscedastic Corrected Errors. The Statistical significance is displayed by the use of 













6.1. Summary of Study Background 
 IPOs have provided a fruitful environment for research, and one of the key areas 
has been the valuation process of IPOs because of asymmetric information issues. Within 
the debates regarding the difficulty of the IPO valuation process, REITs prove to be a rich 
area for further research. Governmental officials, investors, academicians, and others are 
interested REIT IPOs because of their explosive growth over the last 14 years, their 
homogenous asset base, their unique tax status, their regulatory requirements, and their 
investment income yields. 
 This study focuses on analyzing the level of REIT IPO asymmetric information 
content by using the relative spread, the adverse selection component of Glosten and 
Harris (1988), and the adverse selection component of Lin, Sanger, and Booth (1995) 
over the first 45 and 60 days after the IPO.  
 
6.2. Summary of Issue Importance 
 The asymmetric information issues within the IPO process are serious because 
they affect the valuation process. Rock (1986) notes that uninformed investors are at an 
informational disadvantage and thus suffer the “winner’s curse.” In addition, the direct 
relation between asymmetric information and underpricing noted by Beatty and Ritter 
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(1986) implies that issuers can expect to raise less capital as uncertainty increases. Also, 
Lowery, Officer, and Schwert (2008) note that the more challenging the IPO pricing 
process, the wider the distribution of returns for the investor. All of these issues indicate 
the importance of IPO research with regard to asymmetric information because of the 
serious implications to IPO participants, such as issuers, investment banks, and investors. 
 
6.3. Summary of Arguments for REIT IPO Opacity 
 Within the research area of asymmetric information and the REIT IPO valuation 
process, there exists an open debate as to whether REIT IPOs are more or less transparent 
than non-REIT IPOs. As argued by Wang, Chan, and Gau (1992) REIT IPOs are difficult 
to value and pose greater information asymmetry because of the lack of information on 
property pricing and the lack of specificity of properties to be acquired. In addition, Ling 
and Ryngaert (1997) propose that complex UPREIT structures and greater institutional 
investors have made the REITs more difficult to value. 
 
6.4. Summary of Arguments for REIT IPO Transparency 
 An alternative argument is that REIT IPOs have less asymmetric information. 
Ljungqvist (2005) argues for a direct relation between underpricing and asymmetric 
information, and when industrial IPO underprcing and REIT IPO underpricng are 
compared, REITs IPOs appear to have less asymmetric information. 
 In addition, Highfield, Roskelley, and Steele (2009) argue that REITs have fewer 
asymmetric information issues because of property valuation by state and local 
government, similar conventions for estimating vacancy rates and rental rates, and 
regulated, stable dividend income streams.  
 
123 
6.5. Summary of Proxying for Asymmetric Information 
 Dissemination of the proprietary data of informed traders is likely to occur 
through the price discovery process in that “trading resolves the firm’s uncertainty about 
the markets aggregate demand” (Lowery, Officer, and Schwert, 2008). If this is the case, 
then the level of informational asymmetry should be measurable in the aftermarket as 
well. 
 The open debate over REIT IPO asset transparency and the availability of adverse 
selection cost estimation methods of Glosten and Harris (1988) and Lin, Sanger, and 
Booth (1995) provide an excellent opportunity to contribute to the literature by analyzing 
the comparative levels of asymmetric information content of REIT IPOs and non-REIT 
IPOs through the use of unique market microstructure data. 
 One of the few studies to analyze the difference between the asymmetric 
information level for REIT IPO and industrial IPOs is Glascock, Hughes, and Varshney 
(1998). They use the relative bid-ask spreads to analyze the comparative levels of 
asymmetric information and liquidity of industrial IPOs, close-end funds, and REIT 
IPOs. Unfortunately, their multivariate analysis commingles equity, hybrid, and mortgage 
REIT IPO types. This is a problem because each type has different asset risk profile. In 
addition, their sample size of equity REITS, while representative of the period studied is 
small in that only 25 equity REITS went public during the 1985 to 1988 period. 
Moreover, much has changed since their study. In the past 16 years the industry has seen 
tremendous growth of equity REITs, the passage of considerable REIT specific 
legislation, the changing opportunity environment, and the availability of specific proxies 
for asymmetric information content. 
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6.6. Summary of Study Contribution and Hypothesis 
 Following Highfield, Roskelley, and Steele (2009), this study suggests that REITs 
are unique firms that offer a level of operating transparency not found in non-REIT firms 
because of their highly regulated status, tangible and easily valued assets, conventional 
methods of estimation for vacancy and rental rates, predictable cash flow streams, stable 
dividends, and large institutional holdings. 
 
6.7. Summary of Data 
 A sample of 78 equity REIT IPOs are matched based on similar asset size, 
underwriter reputation, and partial adjustment of the offer-price to 123 unique industrial 
IPOs collected from Thompson Financial SDC Platinum New Issues Database for the 
period of January 1, 1993 to December 31, 2007. Additional data for variables is 
collected from SNL REIT Datasource; Compustat, NYSE Trade and Database (TAQ); 
Center for Research of Security Prices (CRSP); the SEC’s Electronic Data, Gathering, 
Analysis, and Retrieval System (EDGAR); and Jay Ritter’s website (Ritter, 2008). 
 
6.8. Summary of Methodology 
 Three multivariate models are used to test the alternative hypothesis. Model (1) 
provides a basis for comparison to the established framework of Glascock, Hughes, and 
Varshney (1998) by using a similar relative bid-ask spread dependent variable and similar 
independent variables. Then, Model (1) extends Glascock, Hughes, and Varshney (1998) 
by using the Glosten and Harris (1988) and Lin, Sanger, and Booth (1995) adverse 




 Although Model (1) extends Glascock, Hughes, and Varshney (1998) by using the 
adverse selection components as dependent variables, Model (1) does not consider other 
control variables found to be related to asymmetric information, initial public offerings, 
or the adverse selection components. Thus, Model (2) extends Model (1) by not only 
considering the previously described independent variables but also these additional 
independent variables. Next, Model (3) modifies Model (2) in order to address a potential 
endogentiy issue by substituting the independent variable PARTIAL for UNDERPR. 
 
6.9. Summary of Results and Implications 
 The results for the period 1993 to 2007 indicate that the asymmetric information 
content of equity REIT IPOs, as proxied by relative spread or the adverse selection cost 
components of Glosten and Harris (1988) and Lin, Sanger, and Booth (1995), are 
significantly less than that of industrial IPOs. This is in contrast to Glascock, Hughes, and 
Varshney’s (1998) finding that REIT IPOs have greater relative spreads than common 
stocks, and that, on the whole, relative spreads of REITs are similar to common stocks. 
 The implications are that investors wishing to invest in IPOs should find it less 
challenging to value REIT IPOs than other common stock initial issues, REIT founders 
going to the capital markets should obtain greater proceeds and leave less on the table, 
and investment bankers will have less information production, which should translate into 
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